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Abstract
We set up a trade model with heterogeneous firms and a worker population that is
heterogeneous in two dimensions: workers are either skilled or unskilled, and within
each skill category there is a continuum of abilities. Workers with high abilities,
both skilled and unskilled, are matched to firms with high productivities, and this
leads to wage differentials within each skill category across firms. Self-selection
of the most productive firms into exporting generates an exporter wage premium,
and our framework with skilled and unskilled workers allows us to decompose this
premium into its skill-specific components. We employ linked employer-employee
data from Germany to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. Using
these parameter estimates, we compute an average exporter wage premium of 5
percent. The decomposition by skill turns out to be quantitatively highly relevant,
with exporting firms paying no wage premium at all to their unskilled workers, while
the premium for skilled workers is 12 percent.
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1 Introduction
The recent literature on international trade has pointed out that the asymmetric exposure of
firms to exporting is an important channel through which trade aﬀects the distribution of wage
incomes in open economies. Based on strong empirical evidence that larger, more productive
firms pay higher wages and have a higher probability of exporting (cf. Bernard and Jensen, 1995,
1999), existing theoretical studies argue that the selection of successful firms into exporting
augments wage inequality through two channels: an increase in the number of jobs in exporting
firms oﬀering high wages; and an increase in the wages exporting firms pay relative to the wages
paid by non-exporters, the so-called exporter wage premium. Diﬀerent theoretical foundations
for such a premium have been provided in recent trade models with firm heterogeneity (cf.
Helpman et al., 2010; Amiti and Davis, 2012; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2012; Sampson, 2014).1
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model that allows us to
decompose the exporter wage premium into its skill-specific components. Second, we struc-
turally estimate the model parameters using matched employer-employee data for Germany and
use those estimated parameter values to compute the skill-specific exporter wage premia in a
theory-consistent way. In our model, the population of workers is heterogeneous in two dimen-
sions: formal skills and abilities. The productivity of firms is a composite of three components:
the innate baseline productivity, and the average ability levels of the skilled and unskilled work-
ers they hire, all of which diﬀer across firms. Eﬀective firm productivity is an increasing function
of the respective firm’s exogenous baseline productivity and of the abilities of its skilled and un-
skilled workforce. We assume that there is a firm-specific ability threshold below which firms
cannot productively employ workers. The ability threshold is increasing in the baseline pro-
ductivity of the firm, and as a consequence our model features positive assortative matching of
high-ability skilled and unskilled workers to firms with a high baseline productivity. This gen-
erates wage dispersion between firms, which is explained by ability diﬀerences of the workforce.
Whereas this outcome is similar to Sampson (2014), in our setting it is the consequence of an
ability threshold and does not require strict log-supermodularity of eﬀective firm productivity.2
It is this feature that keeps our model analytically tractable and helps making it accessible to
structural estimation.
There are two possible outcomes of the matching process in autarky. Wages per eﬃciency
unit of labour can be equalised within a skill category, and firms hire workers with diﬀering
abilities within this category. In this case, we speak of a pooling equilibrium. Alternatively, if
1Evidence for the existence of an exporter wage premium is available for numerous countries, including the US
(Bernard and Jensen, 1999), Mexico (Frias et al., 2009), and several European economies (Schank et al., 2007;
Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; Egger et al., 2013; Hauptmann and Schmerer, 2013; Irrazabal et al., 2013; Klein
et al., 2013). Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Davis and Harrigan (2011) also propose theoretical models in
which exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters. However, in their settings, wage diﬀerentials between firms
are pinned down by technology parameters and are not aﬀected by the exporting decision of firms. Hence, these
papers do not feature an exporter wage premium.
2With wage diﬀerences rooted in ability diﬀerences, our paper is complementary to the approaches of Helpman
et al. (2010), Amiti and Davis (2012), and Egger and Kreickemeier (2012), in which the wage dispersion between
firms is a consequence of rent sharing in the presence of labour market imperfections.
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there is excess demand for high-ability workers along a wage profile with equalised wages per ef-
ficiency unit of labour, relative wages of high-ability workers are driven up, thereby leading to a
separating equilibrium in which firms employ only workers of the lowest ability compatible with
the firm-specific ability threshold. In the separating equilibrium, high-productivity firms end
up paying higher wages per eﬃciency unit of labour than their low-productivity competitors,
thereby reducing the cost advantage of more productive firms. The equilibrium matching out-
come crucially depends on the scarcity of high abilities of the two skill types in the production
process, which is unobservable. However, we observe in the data that wages are more dispersed
for unskilled than for skilled labour, which suggests that abilities of unskilled workers are more
dispersed than abilities of skilled workers. To capture the empirical pattern of wage dispersion,
we therefore impose a parameter constraint ensuring a more equal ability distribution for skilled
than for unskilled workers. This parameter constraint implies that in autarky we have a pooling
equilibrium for unskilled labour and a separating equilibrium for skilled labour.
In the open economy, our model features three groups of firms. All highly productive firms
self-select into exporting, while none of the low-productivity firms export. Of particular interest
are firms with an intermediate productivity level, since we can show that in this group exporters
and non-exporters co-exist. Hence, our model features an overlap in the productivity distri-
butions of exporting and non-exporting firms, which is typically observed in the data but not
accounted for in most international trade models featuring firm heterogeneity.3 Export mar-
ket entry of the most productive firms leads to excess demand for skilled workers of high ability
along the autarky wage profile, leading to an exporter wage premium for skilled workers, defined
in a theory-consistent way as the average increase in the wages of exporting firms relative to
the counterfactual benchmark of autarky. In addition to the premium for skilled workers, there
may or may not be an exporter wage premium for unskilled workers, depending on whether the
additional demand for high-ability workers in the unskilled category can be met with equalised
wages for eﬃciency units of unskilled labour across firms. In both cases, the eﬀect diﬀers be-
tween the two skill groups, and, hence, our model features skill-specific exporter wage premia,
and thus skill-specific eﬀects of trade on the dispersion of wages.
In a second part of the paper, we use our theoretical model as guidance for an empirical
analysis. We employ information from the linked employer-employee dataset (LIAB) of the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), which provides detailed information on German firms
and workers over the period 1996-2008, to structurally estimate key parameters of our model.
Based on these parameter estimates we then contrast observed measures of wage inequality with
those computed from the model. For doing so, we rely on the Theil index as a measure of
inequality that allows us to decompose total wage inequality into its within and between skill-
group components. The model does a fairly good job in explaining overall wage inequality in
the data and correctly predicts wage inequality within the group of unskilled workers. However,
3An exception in this respect is Armenter and Koren (2015), who show that presuming a sharp selection of the
best firms into exporting exaggerates the role played by the extensive margin for explaining the eﬀect of changes
in trade costs on export sales.
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the model underestimates wage inequality within the group of skilled workers as well as wage
inequality between the two skill groups. Overall, accounting for scarcity of skilled workers with
high abilities helps to improve the fit of our model with various aspects of wage inequality
observed in the data.
Evaluating our model at the estimated parameter values, we find that exporters pay a wage
premium only to their skilled workforce. This premium is sizable and amounts to 12 percent.
Weighted with the share of skilled workers employed by exporters, we compute an exporter wage
premium of almost 5 percent on average for all workers. This magnitude is well in line with
estimates from previous empirical research (cf. Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; Egger et al., 2013;
Hauptmann and Schmerer, 2013; Klein et al., 2013, among others). However, existing empirical
work on the exporter wage premium does usually not distinguish between skills, and, hence, the
insights from the present model allow to draw a more nuanced picture of how exporting aﬀects
the wage diﬀerential between firms.4
We conduct two counterfactual experiments based on the estimated model in order to shed
light on how the existence of an exporter wage premium aﬀects the economy-wide distribution
of labour income. In the first experiment, we introduce prohibitive trade costs and enforce a
closed economy in the counterfactual equilibrium. This eliminates the exporter wage premium
for skilled workers and has sizable distributional eﬀects relative to the benchmark scenario.
Relying on the Theil index, a movement to autarky reduces wage inequality within the group of
skilled workers by 36 percent, whereas economy-wide inequality falls by 7 percent. In a second
experiment, we assume that Germany moves from its observed degree of openness to free trade,
and show that the elimination of iceberg trade costs has only small distributional eﬀects and
leads to a more equal distribution of wages, despite an increase in the exporter wage premium.
This illustrates that the impact of trade on income inequality is non-monotonic, because the
increase in the exporter wage premium triggered by a fall in variable trade cost is counteracted
by a compositional eﬀect as more (skilled) workers find employment in exporting firms and can
therefore benefit from the exporter wage premium.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our theoretical
framework and derive the closed economy equilibrium. In Sections 3 and 4 we analyse the
open-economy equilibrium, introduce the Theil index as measure of inequality, and discuss the
distributional eﬀects of trade. In Section 5 we introduce the dataset, structurally estimate key
model parameters, and analyse the fit of our model with the observed distribution of wages.
Section 6 uses the parameter estimates to quantify the exporter wage premium for skilled and
unskilled workers, respectively. There, we also study in two counterfactual experiments how
changes in the exporter wage premia aﬀect economy-wide measures of inequality. In Section
4Two exceptions are the papers by Schank et al. (2007) and Klein et al. (2013), who derive estimates for
skill-specific exporter wage premia from reduced-form regressions. By conditioning on firm size and using plant
and/or spell (worker-firm) fixed eﬀects, they control for most of the underlying firm heterogeneity, so that their
estimates for the exporter wage premia exclude from consideration the wage premium that arises as a consequence
of the selection of high-productivity firms into exporting.
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7 we investigate to what extent the definition of skill groups influences the results from our
analysis. The last section concludes with a summary of the most important results.
2 The closed economy
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider an economy with a mass N of producers, determined endogenously, and an exoge-
nous mass L of workers. The population of workers is heterogeneous in two dimensions, which
we call skill and ability. Skill refers to the formal education an individual has received, and ac-
cording to this criterion we split the mass of workers into two groups, skilled workers Ls and
unskilled workers Lu. Ability on the other hand refers to the exogenous productivity of an in-
dividual, for which we assume a continuous distribution within each skill group. Abilities of
skilled and unskilled workers are denoted α and β, respectively.
Firms are monopolistically competitive, and they produce horizontally diﬀerentiated goods,
for which they face the demand function
x(v) = Ap(v)−σ , (1)
where A is a variable capturing market size, v indexes the firm, and σ > 1 is the constant price
elasticity of demand. Firm-level inputs of skilled and unskilled labour are denoted by ls and lu,
respectively. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
q(v) = ϕˆ(v)ls(v)
ν lu(v)
1−ν (2)
where ϕˆ(v) denotes the overall total factor productivity of firm v, which depends on its baseline
productivity ϕ(v) and on the average abilities of the skilled and unskilled workers in its workforce,
α˜(v) and β˜(v), respectively:
ϕˆ(v) ≡ ϕ(v)η
[
α˜(v)ν β˜(v)1−ν
]1−η
(3)
Eqs. (2) and (3) imply that α˜(v)1−η and β˜(v)1−η give the eﬃciency units per skilled and unskilled
physical labour unit, respectively, as hired by firm v.
We assume that each firm can productively employ only workers above a threshold ability
level. This minimum viable ability is higher in firms with a higher baseline productivity, reflect-
ing in a stylised way the fact that more sophisticated firms require more sophisticated workers.
For simplicity, and to save on notation in the following, we assume that the firm-specific mini-
mum viable ability for both types of labour is equal to the exogenous baseline productivity of the
respective firm.5 Abilities are perfectly observable to the firm. Firms are therefore indiﬀerent
5Sampson (2014) shows that under the assumption of strict log-supermodularity, which requires complemen-
tarity that is stronger than in the Cobb-Douglas case, positive assortative matching with a separating equilibrium
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between hiring workers of diﬀerent abilities within the same skill group if and only if the wage
diﬀerential exactly compensates for the ability diﬀerential, resulting in a wage per eﬃciency unit
of the respective type of labour that is the same for all abilities.
We assume that the baseline productivity ϕ, the ability of skilled workers α, and the ability
of unskilled workers β are all Pareto distributed, with distribution functions G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−g,
S(α) = 1− α−s, and U(β) = 1− β−u, respectively, where we have normalised the lower bound
for all three distributions to unity.6
2.2 Pooling equilibria and separating equilibria
For each skill type of workers, our model allows for two scenarios, which are distinguished by
the elasticity of the wage schedule with respect to worker ability in this skill group. If this
elasticity is equal to 1−η, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labour is equalised across abilities,
and firms are therefore indiﬀerent between hiring workers of diﬀerent ability within this skill
group, provided their ability is higher than the firm-specific threshold level. We label this case
the pooling equilibrium, since firms employ workers of diﬀerent ability in equilibrium. If the
wage schedule increases in worker ability with an elasticity greater than 1 − η, the wage rate
for an eﬃciency unit of labour increases in worker ability, and firms will therefore only employ
workers of the minimum admissible ability in this skill group. We label this case the separating
equilibrium.
The elasticity of the two wage schedules is of course endogenous, and it depends on the shape
parameters of the Pareto distributions of firm baseline productivity and skill-specific worker
ability. Intuitively, a steeply increasing wage profile (and, therefore, a separating equilibrium
for workers in a given skill group) is more likely, ceteris paribus, if the relative supply of high-
ability workers in this skill group is small, i.e., if the shape parameter of the respective ability
distribution is high. We only consider a subset of all possible parametrisations of our model,
thereby ruling out less interesting or less plausible cases. With two skill types and two types of
equilibrium per skill type our model in principle allows for four diﬀerent autarky regimes. We
eliminate on theoretical grounds the two cases featuring either a pooling equilibrium for both
skill types or a separating equilibrium for both skill types. In the former case, wages per labour
eﬃciency unit are equalised across firms for all workers, and firms therefore play no interesting
role for income inequality. In the latter case, firms face vertical supply curves for all factors of
production, and therefore their output is pinned down by the available supply of a specific ability
type, leaving no scope for adjustments in firm size in response to economy-wide shocks, such as
trade liberalisation. Out of the two remaining cases, we focus on the one featuring a separating
in the labour market arises. We have a weaker assumption on technology (by using a Cobb-Douglas function that
is log-supermodular but not strictly so), but therefore need the additional assumption of the firm-specific ability
threshold to generate the same result. The Cobb-Douglas specification for eﬀective firm productivity helps us in
terms of analytical tractability, in particular, since we have two skill groups of workers.
6It is not essential that the distributions of abilities and baseline productivities all have the same domain. For
instance, if the floor of one of the ability distributions were lower than the floor of the productivity distribution,
some low-ability workers would be non-employable and, hence, would not show up in our dataset.
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equilibrium for skilled workers and a pooling equilibrium for unskilled workers. This can be
motivated by the observation documented in Section 5.2 that wage dispersion measured by the
Theil index is less pronounced for unskilled workers than for skilled workers. With pooling of
both skill types, skilled and unskilled wage profiles would have the same elasticity in our model
and a larger ability dispersion of unskilled workers could then be directly inferred from a higher
Theil index of wages for this skill type. With a Pareto distribution, a larger dispersion of abilities
implies lower scarcity of high abilities. Since it is the excess demand for high abilities under
pooling that establishes a separating equilibrium in our model, the skill-specific Theil indices
reported below provide strong arguments for associating autarky with a pooling equilibrium of
unskilled and a separating equilibrium of skilled workers. We assume the following parameter
constraint in order to induce this equilibrium:
Assumption 1. s ≥ s¯ ≡ g + 1− ησ > u.
Lemma 1. Assumption 1 establishes for the closed economy a separating equilibrium for skilled
workers and a pooling equilibrium for unskilled workers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
An intuitive explanation for this parameter constraint is straightforward. As we show in
the Appendix, s¯ is (the absolute value of) the elasticity of labour demand with respect to ϕ
in a knife-edge equilibrium, in which firms hire only workers just compatible with the ability
threshold, but in which the wage per eﬃciency unit of labour is equalised across abilities. If
and only if s, the elasticity of the skilled labour supply with respect to α (also in absolute
value), is larger than this threshold value, the supply of skilled workers decreases faster with
higher abilities than the demand for these skilled workers in the knife-edge equilibrium, and
we therefore see wages per eﬃciency unit that are increasing in skilled worker ability. For an
analogous reason, the parameter constraint in Assumption 1 induces a pooling equilibrium for
unskilled workers under autarky.
2.3 Firm-specific variables
We now derive the profiles across firms for key firm-level variables, namely skilled employment,
unit costs, skilled wages and output. In analogy to Melitz (2003), in the closed economy those
firm-level variables increase in firm-specific baseline productivity ϕ with a constant elasticity,
and we can therefore index firms in the following by ϕ alone.
The distribution of skilled employment across firms is determined by the labour market
clearing condition, which for skilled workers under Assumption 1 must hold separately for each
ability level. Formally, we require that the demand for skilled workers by firms with a baseline
productivity up to ϕ¯, denoted by Lds(ϕ¯), must be equal to the supply of skilled workers with an
7
ability up to α¯ = ϕ¯, denoted by Ls(ϕ¯). We have
Lds(ϕ¯) =
N
1−G(ϕc)
∫ ϕ¯
ϕc
ls(ϕ)dG(ϕ) and Ls(ϕ¯) = Ls
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕc
)−s]
,
where ϕc is the cutoﬀ baseline productivity defining the least productive firm that is actually
producing. The employment profile satisfying the condition Lds(ϕ¯) = Ls(ϕ¯) is given by
ls(ϕ1)
ls(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)g−s
, (4)
where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are two arbitrary baseline productivity levels. Hence, firm-level employment
of skilled workers can be higher or lower in more productive firms, depending on the relative
size of g and s: If and only if the ability distribution of skilled labour has a fatter tail than the
baseline productivity distribution of firms (g > s), firm-level employment of skilled labour is
increasing in firm productivity. This is the empirically relevant case, because in our dataset for
Germany revenues and skilled employment are positively correlated with a coeﬃcient of 0.83,
and revenues are increasing in firm-level productivity in our model under a parameter constraint
introduced below.
Cost minimisation implies that firms choose input bundles such that the cost of skilled labour
is a constant fraction ν of total cost. Hence, we have νq(ϕ)c(ϕ) = ws(ϕ)ls(ϕ), where c(ϕ) is the
unit cost of firm ϕ and ws(ϕ) is the wage firm ϕ pays to its skilled workers, and consequently
ls(ϕ1)
ls(ϕ2)
=
c(ϕ1)
c(ϕ2)
q(ϕ1)
q(ϕ2)
ws(ϕ2)
ws(ϕ1)
. (5)
A goods-market equilibrium in the presence of constant markup pricing implies the standard
link between relative unit costs and relative outputs:
q(ϕ1)
q(ϕ2)
=
(
c(ϕ1)
c(ϕ2)
)−σ
. (6)
The unit cost function c(ϕ) is given, under Assumption 1, by
c(ϕ) = µϕ−η[wˆs(ϕ)]
ν [wˆu]
1−ν
where µ ≡ νν(1− ν)1−ν , wˆs(ϕ) ≡ ws(ϕ)/ϕ1−η is the wage for an eﬃciency unit of skilled labour
paid by firm ϕ, and wˆu is the wage for an eﬃciency unit of unskilled labour, which is the same for
all firms. The unit cost function implies the following link between relative unit costs, relative
skilled wages and relative baseline productivities:
c(ϕ1)
c(ϕ2)
=
(
ws(ϕ1)
ws(ϕ2)
)ν (ϕ2
ϕ1
)ν(1−η)+η
. (7)
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Eqs. (5), (6) and (7) can be solved for relative unit costs, relative outputs, and relative skilled
wages as functions of relative baseline productivities and relative skilled employment. Taking
into account the employment profile required for a labour market equilibrium in Eq. (4), we get
c(ϕ1)
c(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)−∆
,
q(ϕ1)
q(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σ∆
,
ws(ϕ1)
ws(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)Φ
, (8)
where
∆ ≡ η −
s− s¯
σ + (1− ν)/ν
, Φ ≡
ν + (1− ν)η −∆
ν
. (9)
From Assumption 1, we have s ≥ s¯, which implies ∆ ≤ η. We furthermore assume that ∆ is
strictly positive, in which case it can be interpreted as the constant elasticity with which firm-
level marginal costs decrease in firm-level baseline productivity. Firm-level output and firm-level
revenues then increase in baseline productivity with elasticities σ∆ and (σ − 1)∆, respectively.
Φ is the elasticity of the skilled wage schedule with respect to firm-level baseline productivity.
It can be seen that Φ is increasing in s, and that under the parameter constraint imposed by
Assumption 1 elasticity Φ is always larger than 1 − η, as required for a separating equilibrium
in the market for skilled labour. We furthermore assume Φ < s to ensure that the aggregate
wage bill of skilled workers has a finite positive value (see below).
As explained above, firms are indiﬀerent between hiring unskilled workers of the minimum
admissible ability β = ϕ or ones of higher ability, since the wage per eﬃciency unit of unskilled
labour is equalised across ability levels. This has two implications. First, we can express relative
wages of unskilled workers as a function of their relative abilities, not as a function of relative
firm productivity, as
wu(β1)
wu(β2)
=
(
β1
β2
)1−η
, (10)
with 1− η < u to ensure that the aggregate wage bill of unskilled workers has a finite positive
value. Second, the number of physical units of unskilled labour hired by a firm of a given
productivity is not determined (only the number of eﬃciency units is), and therefore it is not
possible to derive a solution for the unskilled employment profile across firms.
2.4 General equilibrium
Having derived the constant-elasticity profiles for the relevant firm-level variables, we now use
general equilibrium constraints to solve for the respective variables of the marginal firm in terms
of model parameters, thereby anchoring the respective firm profiles. We also seek to find a
solution for the endogenous mass of firms N .
All goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms serve as inputs into a homogeneous
final good, for which we assume a CES production function without external scale economies,
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as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009):
Y =
[
N−
1
σ
∫ ∞
ϕc
q(ϕ)
σ−1
σ
dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕc)
] σ
σ−1
.
We choose the final good as the numeraire, and therefore the market size variable in Eq. (1) is
equal to A ≡ Y/N , where Y is real GDP. Market entry occurs via a Melitz-style productivity
lottery with fixed market entry cost fe, paid in units of the final good, and we assume that
all firms die after one period. Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we abstract from fixed
production cost, and therefore all firms that enter the productivity lottery also produce. This
implies ϕc = 1. In equilibrium, the expected profits of entering the lottery have to equal the
fixed market entry cost: R/(Nσ) = fe, where R denotes aggregate revenues. Average revenues
are linked to revenues of the marginal firm by
R
N
=
∫ ∞
1
r(ϕ)dG(ϕ) = r(1)Θ, with Θ ≡
g
g −∆(σ − 1)
> 1
being a constant factor of proportionality.7 We can therefore write revenues of the marginal
firm as r(1) = σfeΘ−1. Using the goods market equilibrium, markup-pricing, and the equality
R = Y , the implied marginal cost is given by c(1) = Θ
1
σ−1 (σ − 1)/σ, and the output of the
marginal firm is determined as q(1) = σfeΘ
− σσ−1 . As an intermediate step towards deriving the
wage rates of the marginal firm, ws(1) and wu(1), we compute aggregate wage bills for skilled
and unskilled workers as
Ws = Ls
∫ ∞
1
ws(α)dS(α) =
sΘ
g
Lsws(1) (11)
and
Wu = Lu
∫ ∞
1
wu(β)dU(β) = ΓLuwu(1), (12)
respectively, with
Γ ≡
u
u+ η − 1
> 1
as the factor of proportionality linking the wage paid to unskilled workers with the lowest ability
to the average wage paid to unskilled workers, and the composite term sΘ/g playing a similar role
in the context of skilled workers. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, relative aggregate
wage bills are constant and given by Ws/Wu = ν/(1 − ν). At the same time, wage rates ws(1)
and wu(1) are linked via the unit-cost function of the marginal firm:
c(1) = µws(1)
νwu(1)
1−ν . (13)
Using these conditions, and substituting for c(1) from above, we get explicit solutions for ws(1)
7It can easily be checked that g > ∆(σ− 1) is equivalent to Φ < s, which is a parameter constraint introduced
above.
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and wu(1):
ws(1) =
σ − 1
µσ
Θ
1
σ−1
(
Γgν
Θs(1− ν)
Lu
Ls
)1−ν
wu(1) =
σ − 1
µσ
Θ
1
σ−1
(
Θs(1− ν)
Γgν
Ls
Lu
)ν
As expected, an increase in the relative mass of skilled workers Ls/Lu reduces the skilled wage
paid by the marginal firm and increases the unskilled wage paid by that firm.
Skilled employment of the marginal firm follows from applying Shephard’s Lemma to the unit
cost function (13) and multiplying the resulting labour input coeﬃcient by firm-level output:
ls(1) = νµ
(
wu(1)
ws(1)
)1−ν
q(1).
The mass of firms N follows from the full-employment condition Ls = N
∫∞
1 ls(ϕ)dG(ϕ):
N =
Ls
ls(1)
s
g
This completes the characterisation of the closed economy.
3 The open economy
We now consider a trade equilibrium between two identical countries. Firms willing to export
have to pay a fixed cost fx, expressed in units of final output Y , and a variable cost of the
iceberg type, with τ > 1 units shipped for one unit to arrive abroad.
Given the parameter constraint in Assumption 1, two possible types of equilibria may emerge
in the open economy. Both feature a separating equilibrium for skilled workers, since exporting
firms are positively selected and therefore the relative demand for high-ability workers of both
skill types is higher in the open economy than in autarky. The diﬀerence arises in the case of
unskilled workers. It is possible that for them the pooling equilibrium from the closed economy
survives, but there is another possibility as well: the extra demand from exporters for high-
ability unskilled workers may lead to an equilibrium in which high-productivity firms have to
pay a higher wage per eﬃciency unit of unskilled labour than low-productivity firms. In this
case, the most able unskilled workers are only hired by high-productivity exporting firms, which
have no use for workers of low ability, while the low-ability workers are hired by non-exporting
firms, resulting in pooling of unskilled workers over (two) subsets of firms. Within both groups,
the wage per eﬃciency unit is equalised across abilities.
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3.1 Firm-level variables and the decision to export
With two identical countries, the gain in operating profits from exporting for each firm is equal
to τ1−σr(ϕ)/σ, where r(ϕ) is the domestic revenue of a firm with productivity ϕ. For a firm
that is indiﬀerent between exporting and not exporting, this gain in operating profits has to be
equal to the fixed export cost fx:
τ1−σr(ϕ) = σfx (14)
While this indiﬀerence condition is of course standard, it is straightforward to see that in our
model – diﬀerent from Melitz (2003) and most of the papers in the literature featuring positive
export selection – there cannot be a strict separation of exporters and non-exporters in terms
of their baseline productivity. Suppose there were such a sharp separation, and focus on the
labour market equilibrium for skilled workers. With a baseline productivity threshold dividing
exporting from non-exporting firms, there would have to be an upward jump in the skilled wage
profile at the export baseline productivity cutoﬀ, since exporting firms have a discretely higher
labour demand than non-exporters, while the ability-specific labour supply is fixed. With the
distribution of baseline productivity being continuous, this would entail an upward jump in the
marginal cost profile at the cutoﬀ productivity level, which would be incompatible with positive
exporter selection in a model such as ours, in which firms treat wages parametrically.8
Rather than one baseline productivity threshold, our model has two, the lower export cutoﬀ
ϕx1 and the upper export cutoﬀ ϕ
x
2 . They are the boundaries of a baseline productivity interval
with a co-existence of exporters and non-exporters, all of which are indiﬀerent between exporting
and non-exporting, and hence – according to Eq. (14) – all of which earn the same domestic
revenues r(ϕ). The share of exporters at each baseline productivity level within this interval
is implicitly defined by a labour market clearing condition analogous to Eq. (4) for the closed
economy, which is given by
ls(ϕ)
ls(1)
=
ϕg−s
1 + τ1−σχ(ϕ)
, ∀ ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2). (15)
There, ls(ϕ) is the skilled employment used for the output that is sold domestically, and χ(ϕ)
is the fraction of firms exporting among all the firms with baseline productivity ϕ. We have
χ(ϕx1) = 0 and χ(ϕ
x
2) = 1, and, as will be shown below, χ
′(ϕ) > 0 ∀ ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2).
The corresponding wage profile follows directly from the fact that in the interval [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2 ]
the firm-specific skilled wage bill ws(ϕ)ls(ϕ) is constant, since with Cobb-Douglas production
technology it is proportional to firm-specific revenues r(ϕ). Using Eq. (8), we get
ws(ϕ)
ws(1)
= (ϕx1)
Φ+g−s [1 + τ1−σχ(ϕ)]ϕs−g, ∀ ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2). (16)
8Discontinuities in the marginal cost profile across firms are compatible with a single export baseline produc-
tivity cutoﬀ in models featuring wage setting by firms, as in Helpman et al. (2010) and Egger and Kreickemeier
(2012).
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The two export cutoﬀs are implicitly defined by the condition that Eq. (14) holds, given the
respective skilled wages
ws(ϕ
x
1) = (ϕ
x
1)
Φws(1),
ws(ϕ
x
2) = (ϕ
x
1)
Φws(1)
(
ϕx1
ϕx2
)g−s
[1 + τ1−σ].
The employment profile in Eq. (15) and the wage profile in Eq. (16) are not fully determined
yet, since χ(ϕ) is endogenous. However, using the solution for χ(ϕ) derived below one can show
that the employment profile is strictly decreasing in [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2), while the skilled wage profile is
increasing with an elasticity larger than Φ. This is intuitive, because similar to other Melitz-type
models, more productive firms in our setting have a higher propensity to export, leading to an
additional demand for skilled workers with high abilities by firms with higher productivity. In
our setting, this drives up wages per eﬃciency unit of skilled labour and, at the same time,
leads to less employment of skilled workers in domestic production in the interval [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2). At
baseline productivities outside of that interval the wage profile and the employment profile are
increasing with the same constant elasticities as in autarky. For productivities ϕ < ϕx1 the
respective profiles are given by Eqs. (4) and (8); for productivities ϕ ≥ ϕx2 they are given by:
ls(ϕ)
ls(1)
=
(
1
1 + τ1−σ
)
ϕg−s
ws(ϕ)
ws(1)
=
(
ϕx1
ϕx2
)Φ+g−s (
1 + τ1−σ
)
ϕΦ
∀ϕ ≥ ϕx2 .
Figures 1 and 2 show graphical representations of the employment and wage profiles just de-
rived.9 Both profiles depend on the endogenous variables ϕx1 , ϕ
x
2 and χ(ϕ), but conditional on
those variables, they are independent of the existence of an exporter wage premium for unskilled
workers.
In the following we sketch the open economy equilibrium for the more complicated case, in
which an exporter wage premium for unskilled workers exists. The case where such a premium is
absent follows as a special case, as we will point out. If an exporter wage premium for unskilled
workers exists, there is an interval [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2) in which the wage per eﬃciency unit of unskilled
labour increases with constant elasticity, while being constant both below ϕu1 and above ϕ
u
2 :
wu(β)
wu(1)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β1−η if β < ϕu1(
β
ϕu1
)ν(u+η/ν−s)
β1−η if β ∈ [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 )
(ϕu2/ϕ
u
1 )
ν(u+η/n−s) β1−η if β ≥ ϕu2 .
(17)
Therefore, a firm with productivity ϕ < ϕu1 only employs unskilled workers with abilities in the
9While linearity below ϕx1 and above ϕ
x
2 follows from the model, linearity between the two export cutoﬀs is
used for convenience, and not implied by the model.
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Figure 1: The Employment Profile in the Open Economy
interval [ϕ,ϕu1 ), while a firm with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ
u
1 ,ϕ
u
2 ) only employs workers with ability
exactly matching its productivity ϕ. A firm with productivity above ϕu2 is indiﬀerent between
hiring unskilled workers with abilities equal to or higher than its baseline productivity. In other
words, there is a separating equilibrium for unskilled labour in the interval [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ) and two
pooling equilibria, one above and one below this interval. As in the case of skilled workers,
the existence of a separating equilibrium for unskilled workers is the result of scarcity of high
abilities, which can only materialise in our model if the supply of high-ability unskilled workers
is not too large (relative to high-ability skilled workers). Specifically, a necessary condition for
an interval [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2) to exist is u+ η/ν − s > 0.
10
Both ϕu1 and ϕ
u
2 lie strictly inside the interval [ϕ
x
1 ,ϕ
x
2), and equipped with this result we can
10To get an intuition for the role played by the sign of u + η/ν − s, consider the excess demand for unskilled
workers with an ability equal to the firm-specific ability threshold, evaluated at an equal wage per eﬃciency
unit for these workers. In the closed economy, the thus defined excess demand is monotonically decreasing in
ϕ, whereas in the open economy it increases over the interval [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2) if u + η/ν − s > 0. This condition is
necessary but not suﬃcient for a separating equilibrium of unskilled workers over a subdomain of ϕ, because it is
not guaranteed a priori that the large supply of unskilled workers with high abilities is exhausted by the additional
demand from exporting firms in the open economy.
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Figure 2: The Skilled Wage Profile in the Open Economy
fully characterise χ(ϕ) as a function of the cutoﬀ productivities ϕu1 , ϕ
u
2 and ϕ
x
1 :
χ(ϕ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if ϕ < ϕx1[(
ϕ
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
− 1
]
τσ−1 if ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
u
1 )[(
ϕ
ϕu1
)1+g−νs−(1−ν)u (ϕu1
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
− 1
]
τσ−1 if ϕ ∈ [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 )[(
ϕ
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
(
ϕu2
ϕu1
)(1−ν)[s−u−η/ν]
− 1
]
τσ−1 if ϕ ∈ [ϕu2 ,ϕ
x
2)
1 if ϕ ≥ ϕx2
(18)
It follows from Eq. (18) that χ(ϕ) increases monotonically in ϕ over the interval [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2).
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Since χ(ϕ2) = 1, we can express the ratio of export cutoﬀs ϕx2/ϕ
x
1 as a function of trade costs τ
and of λ ≡ ϕu2/ϕ
u
1 :
ϕx2
ϕx1
=
(
1 + τ1−σ
) ν
∆[1+ν(σ−1)] λ
ν(1−ν)(u+η/ν−s)
∆[1+ν(σ−1)] , (19)
with λ = 1 if there is pooling of unskilled workers over the whole range of ϕ, and λ > 1,
otherwise. Hence λ can be interpreted as a measure for the scarcity of high-ability unskilled
workers, with higher values of λ reflecting more scarcity.
11It can be checked that under Assumption 1 the exponent 1 + g − νs− (1− ν)u is strictly positive.
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3.2 Economy-wide variables
Our key variables of interest in the open economy are the exporter wage premia for unskilled
and skilled workers. They are defined in our paper in terms of normalised wages, which are the
wages paid by non-marginal firms relative to the respective wage paid by the marginal firm.
Using this concept, we define the exporter wage premium for skilled workers as the percentage
increase in the average normalised wage paid by firms above the export cutoﬀ ϕx1 relative to
the average normalised wage paid by the same firms in a counterfactual situation in which no
firm exports. The exporter wage premium for unskilled workers is defined analogously, the only
diﬀerence being that the productivity cutoﬀ used is ϕu1 , not ϕ
x
1 , since for unskilled workers this
is the threshold above which firms start paying a wage premium. The exporter wage premia
thus defined are related to the respective aggregate wage bills by the conditions
Ws = Ls
∫ ∞
1
ws(α)dS(α) =
sΘ
g
Lsws(1)
[
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘ ωs
]
(20)
and
Wu = Lu
∫ ∞
1
wu(β)dU(β) = ΓLuwu(1)
[
1 + (ϕu1 )
−uΓ ωu
]
, (21)
where we can write the exporter wage premium for either skill type as a function of model
parameters and a single endogenous variable, λ:
ωs ≡ ωs(λ) and ωu ≡ ωu(λ). (22)
Whereas the solutions for ωs and ωu involve lengthy expressions that are delegated to the
Appendix, the impact of λ on the exporter wage premia is intuitive. A larger λ reflects more
scarcity of unskilled workers with high abilities, and, hence, results in a larger exporter wage
premium for this skill group. With a Cobb-Douglas technology a higher return to unskilled
workers implies a lower return to skilled workers, and, hence, the exporter wage premium of
skilled workers decreases in λ. For λ = 1, the expressions in Eq. (22) collapse to
ωs(1) =
1
(Ξ− 1)[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
[
1−
(
1 + τ1−σ
)−(Ξ−1)]
and ωu(1) = 0, (23)
respectively, with
Ξ ≡
gν
∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
.
The free entry condition in the open economy is given by R/(Nσ) = fe + χfx, where χ is
the overall share of firms that are exporting. The link between average revenues and revenues
of the marginal firm can be computed in analogy to the closed economy as
R
N
= Θr(1)
[
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘωs
]
(24)
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Finally, the exporter indiﬀerence condition for the firm with productivity ϕx1 can be written as
r(1) = σfxτ
σ−1 (ϕx1)
−(σ−1)∆ (25)
The free entry condition can be combined with Eqs. (24) and (25) to an implicit function
A(ωs,χ,ϕx1 , τ, fx) = 0, linking the three endogenous variables ωs, χ, and ϕ
x
1 .
The share of exporting firms is computed by integrating over the productivity-specific ex-
porting shares χ(ϕ):
χ =
∫ ϕx2
ϕx1
χ(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕx2
dG(ϕ)
= τσ−1(ϕx1)
−g
{
Θωs + (Θ− 1)
[
1− (1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx2
ϕx1
)−g]}
. (26)
Using Eqs. (19), (22), and (26) to substitute for ωs and χ in A(·) = 0, we arrive at the implicit
function
Ω(ϕx1 ,λ; τ, fx) = 0, (27)
giving combinations between the endogenous variables λ and ϕx1 that are compatible with free
entry as well as an indiﬀerence about exporting of the marginal exporting firm. As we show
in the Appendix, the partial derivatives of Ω(·) with respect to τ and fx are positive, and the
partial derivatives with respect to ϕx1 and λ are negative. Hence, we have
dλ
dϕx1
∣∣∣∣
Ω=0
< 0,
dϕx1
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ω=0
> 0, and
dϕx1
dfx
∣∣∣∣
Ω=0
> 0
for parameter values that lead to a solution for Ω = 0 with ϕx1 > 1 and λ > 1, which requires
that the fixed costs of exporting are suﬃciently high:
fxτσ−1
fe
>
[
1 + (Θ − 1)
(
1 + τ1−σ
)−(Ξ−1)]−1
. (28)
For the parameter domain in (28), there exists a well-defined lower productivity bound ϕx
1
≥ 1
and a well-defined upper productivity bound ϕx1 > 1, such that Ω = 0 has a solution with λ ≥ 1
if ϕx1 ∈ [ϕ
x
1
,ϕx1 ].
12 In this case, Ω = 0 establishes a negative relationship between ϕx1 and λ.
A higher λ reflects a stronger scarcity of unskilled workers with high abilities and thus higher
labour costs for high-productivity firms. Since the least-productive exporters do not have to
pay a premium for unskilled workers due to ϕu1 > ϕ
x
1 , they benefit from the now higher labour
costs of their high-productivity competitors at home and abroad, and, hence, more firms find it
attractive to start exporting, which induces a decline in ϕx1 . Higher costs of exporting increase
the minimum productivity required to survive in the export market, leading to a higher ϕx1 .
12The lower bound of this interval is equal to 1 if fxτ
σ−1 ≤ fe, and it is larger than unity otherwise. The upper
bound is implicitly determined by Ω(ϕx1 , 1; τ, fx) = 0.
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A second implicit relationship between ϕx1 and λ can be derived from two labour market
equilibrium conditions for unskilled workers in the case where there is an exporter wage premium
for this group of workers, i.e., if λ is greater than 1. In this case, there is a pooling of unskilled
workers with ability β ≤ ϕu1 in firms with baseline productivity ϕ ∈ [1,ϕ
u
1 ) and a pooling of
unskilled workers with ability β ≥ ϕu2 in firms with baseline productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ
u
2 ,∞). We
show in the Appendix that the condition for both labour market equilibrium conditions to hold
at the same time can be expressed as an implicit function Φ(λ,ϕx1 ; τ) = 0, and the resulting
comparative statics are given by
dλ
dϕx1
∣∣∣∣
Φ=0
< 0 and
dλ
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Φ=0
< 0.
Φ(·) = 0 has a solution in the relevant parameter domain only, if
λ¯ > 1, (29)
where
λ¯ ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 if u+ ην − s ≤ 0[(
1 + τ1−σ
) (
Θ∆
gν
u
Γ(u+η/ν−s)
)− 1Ξ−1 ] 1g+1−νs−(1−ν)u
if u+ ην − s > 0
(30)
is defined to cover cases with a small or a large supply of unskilled workers with high abilities.
The negative relationship between ϕx1 and λ established by Φ = 0 follows from the observation
that a lower propensity to export, i.e., a higher ϕx1 , reduces the scarcity of high-ability unskilled
workers and, therefore, reduces λ. Higher variable trade costs reduce the export sales for any
given cutoﬀ baseline productivity ϕx1 . This reduces the scarcity of unskilled workers with high
abilities, reflected in a decline of λ.
In the Appendix, we show that our model features a unique and stable equilibrium with a
selection of firms into exporting under the suﬃcient condition that
fxτσ−1
fe
>
[
1 + (Θ − 1)
(
1 + τ1−σ
)−(Ξ−1)
max
{
1, λ¯−Ξ(1−ν)(u+η/ν−s)
}]−1
. (31)
The roles played by the various parameter constraints are illustrated in Figure 3. Conditions (28)
and (29) imply that both the Ω(·) = 0 locus and the Φ(·) = 0 locus have support in the relevant
parameter range. Condition (31) ensures that the Ω(·) = 0 locus lies above the Φ(·) = 0 locus
at ϕx
1
. This enforces an equilibrium with ϕx1 > 1 and, thus, one with selection into exporting.
The solid curves in Figure 3 represent the implicit functions Ω(·) = 0 and Φ(·) = 0 for a case in
which low trade costs establish an equilibrium with λ > 1, as reflected in the intersection point
A. In view of condition (31), it must then be true that the Ω(·) = 0 locus cuts the Φ(·) = 0
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locus from above, implying
dλ
dϕx1
∣∣∣∣
Ω=0
<
dλ
dϕx1
∣∣∣∣
Φ=0
. (32)
This establishes stability, because starting from an oﬀ-equilibrium point such as A′, (Walrasian)
market forces bring the economy to the equilibrium point A.
✲
✻
ϕx1
λ
1
λ¯
1
λ¯′
!A
(ϕx1)o
λo
!
(ϕx1)
′
B
ϕx1ϕ
x
1
✲τ ↑
❄
τ ↑
!
A′ ✲
❄✲
❄
Ω(·) = 0
Φ(·) = 0
Figure 3: The open economy equilibrium
In Figure 3, we also show that an increase in variable trade costs shifts locus Ω(·) = 0
rightwards and locus Φ(·) = 0 downwards. If the increase in τ is suﬃciently large, the economy
ends up in an equilibrium such as B, in which high abilities of unskilled workers are no longer
scarce and, thus, λ = 1. In this case, an exporter wage premium for unskilled workers does not
exist and the cutoﬀ baseline productivity is given by ϕx1 . Although not explicitly shown, it is
easily confirmed from Figure 3 that a further increase in τ would eventually lead to an outcome
in which Φ(·) = 0 has no solution for ϕx1 ,λ ≥ 1.
We round oﬀ the discussion in this section by summarising the insights from the analysis
above regarding the implications of trade for skilled and unskilled wages.
Proposition 1. Under the parameter constraint in (31) international trade exacerbates the
scarcity of high-ability skilled workers, thereby increasing their return relative to low-ability work-
ers and generating an exporter wage premium for this skill group. High ability unskilled workers
become scarce in the open economy only if their supply is suﬃciently small and trade costs are
low. If this is the case, trade will lead to an exporter wage premium also for unskilled workers,
but the premium will be smaller than the one for skilled workers.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
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The wage eﬀects in Proposition 1 are instrumental for the eﬀects of trade on the economy-wide
inequality level, which are studied in detail in the next section.
4 Trade and income inequality
To measure income inequality we use the Theil index, which for the distribution of individual
labour income w over the interval [w,w] can be computed as
T =
∫ w
w
w
µw
ln
w
µw
dF (w),
where µw is average income, and F (w) is the cumulative distribution function of w. A higher
value of T is associated with higher inequality, and the Theil index has a minimum value of
zero, if income is equally distributed among all workers. A nice feature of the Theil index is
its decomposability, which allows us to split the economy-wide inequality into inequality within
the groups of skilled and unskilled workers, measured by indices Ts and Tu, respectively, and
inequality between the two subgroups, measured by index Tb (see Shorrocks, 1980). For our
model, we can write the economy-wide Theil index as
T = νTs + (1− ν)Tu + Tb,
with
Tb ≡ ν ln
(
(Lu + Ls)ν
Ls
)
+ (1− ν) ln
(
(Lu + Ls)(1− ν)
Lu
)
.
Parameters ν and 1−ν measure the income shares of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively,
which due to the Cobb-Douglas technology in Eq. (2) are constant. This implies that access to
exporting has an impact on inequality only through its eﬀect on the Theil sub-indices Ts and
Tu. These subindices are given by
Tu =
Lu
Wu
∫ ∞
1
wu(β) ln
[
Luwu(β)
Wu
]
dU(β) (33)
and
Ts =
Ls
Ws
∫ ∞
1
ws(α) ln
[
Ls
Ws
ws(α)
]
dS(α) (34)
Based on the Theil index, trade has the following distributional eﬀects:
Proposition 2. Trade increases the income inequality of skilled workers. The income inequality
of unskilled workers remains unaﬀected, if there is pooling of unskilled workers over all firms,
whereas it increases in response to trade, if there is pooling of unskilled workers over subsets of
firms. In both cases, the economy-wide inequality is higher in the open than the closed economy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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With a pooling of unskilled workers over all firms, the wage profile of unskilled workers is
pinned down by the ability of these workers. As a consequence, the Theil index measuring
the inequality among unskilled workers is unaﬀected by trade and given by its autarky level:
Tu = Γ − 1 − lnΓ. In this case, we can focus on Ts when studying the consequences of trade
on income inequality. As formally shown in the Appendix, Ts is always larger in the open than
in the closed economy, where Ts = sΘ/g − 1 − ln[sΘ/g]. This is because trade renders skilled
workers with high abilities a scarce resource in our model, which generates an exporter wage
premium and augments income inequality within this skill group. With a pooling of unskilled
workers over subsets of firms, high-ability workers of both skill types become a scarce resource
in the open economy, leading to a wage premium of skilled and unskilled workers employed by
exporting firms. The existence of exporter wage premia gives rise to higher inequality within the
sub-groups of skilled and unskilled workers, adding up to higher economy-wide income inequality.
We complete the discussion in this section by noting that despite a steeper wage profile for
skilled than unskilled workers, it is not clear a priori in our model that Ts > Tu. The reason
is that the Theil index weighs individual wages (relative to the mean) by the relative frequency
of workers receiving this wage. Hence, the scarcity of high abilities among skilled workers,
which is responsible for larger wage diﬀerences among skilled than unskilled workers in the first
place, leads to lower weights of high wages in the skilled compared to the unskilled population
of workers, thereby counteracting the direct impact of higher wage diﬀerences on skill-specific
Theil indices.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we empirically implement the theoretical model outlined above to estimate the
key parameters step by step. For this purpose, we use detailed information on German firms
from the linked employer-employee dataset (LIAB), provided by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB).13 This dataset matches representative firm-level survey information from the
IAB establishment panel, which is drawn from a stratified sample of establishments with the
stratum being defined over 16 (manufacturing and service) industries, 10 categories of estab-
lishment size, and 16 German states.14 The survey is conducted by Infratest Sozialforschung
on behalf of the IAB, yielding a high response rate of about 80 percent. The dataset includes
important firm characteristics such as the export status as well as total, domestic, and foreign
sales.
LIAB matches the establishment data with individual information on workers who are em-
ployed full-time in one of the establishments in this sample as of 30 June in the respective year.
The individual data comprise information on educational attainment, distinguishing six levels
13Alda et al. (2005) give detailed information on the LIAB dataset, which is confidential but not exclusive, i.e.,
it is available for non-commercial research by visiting the research data centre of the German Federal Employment
Agency at the IAB in Nuremberg, Germany (see also http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx).
14We use the terms firm and establishment synonymously in this section.
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of education by the highest degree attained by a worker: 1) lower secondary school, interme-
diate school leaving certificate or less and no vocational training; 2) lower secondary school,
intermediate school leaving certificate or less and vocational training; 3) high-school degree and
no vocational training; 4) high-school degree and vocational training; 5) college degree; and 6)
university degree. We classify individuals from the first education group as unskilled and indi-
viduals with a degree from a college or university as skilled workers (see Su¨dekum, 2008). With
regard to the three remaining groups, we follow Klein et al. (2013) and use information on the
employment status of a worker to classify her as either skilled (if employed as a white-collar
worker) or unskilled (if employed as a blue-collar worker).15 Our sample covers the years 1996
to 2008, which is the time period before the Subprime Crisis. For this period, we have reli-
able information on establishments all over Germany. Since our model is not informative about
adjustment processes, we do not use the time dimension of the data and instead work with a
cross-section of averages by firm.
We drop all establishments that lack sales or employment information. We also drop estab-
lishments featuring a value added of less than 10 percent of their sales, because some estab-
lishments in the data record negative or other implausible values of value added. This gives
a sample of 22,149 establishments, with 7,024 of these establishments (≈ 31.71 percent) being
active in the export market.
Descriptive statistics of the establishments are summarised in Table 1. As shown in the
table, the average firm in our dataset employs 90.42 workers, with 40.31 percent of its workforce
being skilled according to the adopted definition of this group. Not all firms in the data employ
both skilled and unskilled workers. The skill premium on wages amounts to 28.81 percent. The
wages reported in Table 1 are computed using firm-level averages for the respective skill groups
per annum. The sales level of the average firm in the sample is 26 million Euro. There is a
substantial heterogeneity in firm size, with sales varying between 5.12 thousand and 19.60 billion
Euro, and the workforce varying between 0.04 and 43,225.16 employees.16
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 confirm the insight from previous studies that exporters
are significantly larger than non-exporters, supporting a selection of the best firms into export-
ing (cf. Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard et al., 2012). On average, exporters have 127.31
percent higher sales and employ 116.79 percent more workers than the average (exporting or
non-exporting) firm in the data. At the same time, exporters in the data display a lower skill-
intensity than the average firm. This is in contrast to evidence for Chilean establishments
reported by Harrigan and Reshef (2015). However, it is well in line with our theoretical model,
which explains a low skill intensity of exporters by the scarcity of high-ability skilled workers.
Finally, the descriptives in Table 1 show that the skill premium paid by German exporters is
15In a robustness analysis below, we consider alternative definitions of the groups of skilled and unskilled
workers. Since wages are right-censored, we follow the literature and impute wages for the best-paid employees
in our dataset (see, for instance, Schafer, 1997; Schank et al., 2007). Details on this imputation are available on
request.
16Fractional values for the number of workers are the result of computing full-year equivalents of the number
of days employed and of averaging establishment information over the covered years.
22
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
– All firms –
Nr. of employees 22,149 90.42 465.46 0.04 43,225.16
Nr. of unskilled 22,149 53.97 293.36 0.00 25,968.37
Nr. of skilled 22,149 36.45 196.98 0.00 17,256.80
Wages unskilled 18,062 24,550.78 8,205.45 7,821.95 82,754.99
Wages skilled 18,679 31,640.59 12,220.96 7,796.40 95,512.98
Sales (in 1,000) 22,149 26,000 215,000 5.12 19,600,000
– Exporters –
Nr. of employees 7,024 196.02 780.92 0.33 43,225.16
Nr. of unskilled 7,024 123.03 493.54 0.00 25,968.37
Nr. of skilled 7,024 72.99 323.63 0.00 17,256.80
Wages unskilled 6,221 27,555.06 7,915.31 8,538.78 72,693.95
Wages skilled 6,674 37,670.19 11,470.78 7,843.38 95,512.98
Sales (in 1,000) 7,024 59,100 363,000 9,742.79 19,600,000
Notes: Figures in this table are based on averages at the firm-level over 1996 to 2008. Wages
and sales levels are in real Euro values (base year 2000).
7.83 percentage points (or 27.12 percent) higher than the skill premium paid by the average Ger-
man firm. This provides further support for our theoretical argument that exporting increases
particularly the scarcity of skilled workers with high abilities.
5.1 Estimation strategy and results
For the fully-fledged quantitative model, we need to estimate seven parameters, namely
{ν,σ, g, s, u, η, τ}. It is shown in the following that ν, σ, and τ as well as the composite parame-
ters ∆/g and Φ/g can be estimated directly from firm-level information, using OLS. Combining
the estimates of the two composite parameters allows us to recover estimates for g and s as
functions of η. Parameters u and η cannot be estimated from firm level information with-
out knowing the realization of λ ≥ 1. Therefore, we use information on unskilled wages in a
grid-search routine to estimate parameters u and η in consideration of the general equilibrium
constraints imposed by our model. Since the estimation results for u and η do not influence the
other parameter estimates, we can conduct our estimation in two steps.17
17A two-stage estimation procedure similar to ours, with linear regressions in the first stage and GMM in
the second stage, has recently been used by Antra`s et al. (2017). Also related, Cos¸ar et al. (2016) set several
parameters in accordance to earlier empirical studies and then estimate the remaining parameters using GMM.
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Step one: OLS estimation of the parameters {ν,σ, τ,∆/g,Φ/g}
We first estimate the three parameters ν, σ and τ . Parameter ν measures the cost share of skilled
workers in the total wage bill of a firm. We can estimate ν as an average from a regression
ws,vls,v
ws,vls,v + wu,vlu,v
= ν + errorv. (35)
where v is used as a firm index, and subscripts u and s refer to skilled and unskilled workers.
This yields an estimate of νˆ = 0.466 with a standard error of 0.003. This estimate is slightly
higher than the skilled labour shares for Mexico reported by Feenstra and Hanson (1997), which
range between 0.37 and 0.41. In contrast to them, we do not distinguish skilled and unskilled
workers by their employment as non-production and production workers, but instead use the
level of educational attainment to distinguish between skill groups.
We estimate σ from the ratio of firm-specific total sales, rv, and operating profits (defined
as value-added net of wage bill), ψv, from a regression of the form
rv
ψv
= σ + errorv, (36)
Using this procedure, we obtain an estimate of σˆ = 8.261 with a standard error of 2.933. This
estimate of σ is somewhat higher than the average estimate reported by Broda and Weinstein
(2006), which amounts to 6.5. However, σˆ lies within the range of parameter estimates typically
found on the basis of gravity equations (cf. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, for an overview).
The parameter τ can be estimated according to
rxv
rdv
= t0 + errorv (37)
where rdv and r
x
v are the domestic and foreign sales of an exporting firm, respectively, and
t0 ≡ τ1−σ is a constant. Under the present assumptions, we obtain an estimate of tˆ0 = 0.732
with a standard error of 0.034. In view of the σ-estimate reported above, this corresponds to an
average iceberg-transport-cost parameter of τˆ = 1.044. This estimate is lower than the trade-
cost estimates typically obtained from gravity equations. For instance, Novy (2013) reports a
τ -estimate for Germany in 2000 of 1.69, whereas Milner and McGowan (2013) estimate τ -levels
for Germany that range from 1.39 to 1.53 between 1996 and 2004.18 However, one should keep
in mind that when relying on the textbook gravity model in a model with heterogeneous firms,
the estimated trade costs comprise both fixed and variable barriers to international trade, and,
hence, it is not surprising that our estimate for τ is lower than the overall trade-cost estimates
from gravity models.19
18We would like to thank Chris Milner for providing country-specific estimates of τ .
19We cannot rule out that our assumption of symmetric countries leads us to underestimate the size of the
export market, thereby leading to a downward bias in the estimate of the iceberg-trade-cost parameter. One way
to avoid this potential downward bias in the estimation of τ would be to follow Egger et al. (2013) in formulating a
model with potentially asymmetric countries. However, since our dataset has no information about the destination
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We now turn to the estimation of composite parameters ∆/g and Φ/g. For this purpose, we
adopt an idea outlined by Arkolakis (2010): With Pareto-distributed productivities and CES
demand, if relative firm-level revenues are a monotonic function of these firms’ productivities
(a feature that our model has, along with most other models building on Melitz, 2003), the
link of a firm’s revenue to its percentile position p in the revenue distribution is informative
about the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto productivity distribution. In our model
with firm-specific skilled wages, an analogous argument holds for the link between the skilled
wage paid by a firm and its percentile position p in the wage distribution.
Since both the revenue distribution and skilled wage distribution across firms are distributed
Pareto in their upper tails, i.e., for all lower truncations ϕ¯ > ϕx2 , with shape parameters
(σ − 1)∆/g and Φ/g, respectively, we can therefore learn about these composite parameters
from linking revenues and skilled wages of exporters with baseline productivity ϕ > ϕ¯ to their
percentile positions in the revenue and skilled wage distribution. Denoting by ϕp the baseline
productivity at percentile p, we can write ϕp/ϕ¯ = (1− Prp/100)−1/g , where Prp ∈ {1, ..., 99} is
the percentile position of a firm with baseline productivity ϕp in the productivity distribution
of exporters with ϕ > ϕ¯, and rankp ≡ 1 − Prp/100 is the respective firm’s rank in this distri-
bution.20 Denoting by r˜p and w˜ps average revenues and average skilled wages of firms that are
more productive than firm p, we can derive the following two regression equations:
ln r˜p = α0 + α1 ln rankp + errorp, (38)
ln w˜ps = β0 + β1 ln rankp + errorp (39)
where α0 and β0 are constants and α1 ≡ −(σ − 1)∆/g and β1 ≡ −Φ/g are functions of the
vector of model parameters x ≡ (ν,σ, s, g, η).21
Except for the requirement that firms considered for the estimation of α1 and β1 must have
a productivity of ϕ > ϕx2 , there is no further constraint confining the choice of ϕ¯. In the absence
of a strong prior, we estimate Eq. (38) for diﬀerent realizations of ϕ¯, which is linked to χ¯, the
share of exporters with a productivity greater than ϕ¯, by χ¯ ≡ (ϕ¯)−g. The diﬀerent realizations
of ϕ¯ are generated by ordering exporters by their revenues, dividing them into subgroups of
100 producers, and then estimating Eq. (38) for diﬀerent combinations of these subgroups. In
particular, we estimate parameter α1 for the 100 largest exporters, add the next 100 exporters,
re-estimate parameter α1, and continue this process until the set of subgroups of exporters
of exports, we would not be able to disentangle relative market size from the trade-cost parameter itself without
adding a new, arbitrary identification assumption. For this reason, and also because the estimation of trade costs
is not the main focus of this analysis, we stick to the more parsimonious model variant with symmetric countries
and discuss the aptitude of the model to capture important features of the data below.
20Since observed ranks of firms in the revenue and skilled wage distribution are positively but not perfectly
correlated, we associate rankp with a firm’s rank in the revenue distribution and therefore approximate the
productivity distribution by the observed distribution of revenues in our dataset.
21Instead of using averages as left-hand side variables, we could simply link each exporter’s revenue and skilled
wage to its rank in the respective distribution in order to estimate α1 and β1. However, working with averages
helps guarding against mis-measurement of revenues and wages at the firm level and thus gives more reliable
results.
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is exhausted. Since our dataset comprises 7,024 exporters, this process gives us 70 diﬀerent
α1-estimates, which vary over the interval (−0.815,−0.608).
To select a specific parameter estimate, we use the general-equilibrium relationship implied
by the model, according to which total revenues of all exporters, Rx, are linked to total revenues
of exporters with ϕ > ϕ¯, R¯x, by
Rx
R¯x
= 1 +
(
χ
χ¯
− 1
)
1
Θ
. (40)
Since Rx, R¯x, χ, and χ¯ are all observable, we can use Eq. (40) to compute 70 values of Θ,
based on the same subgroups of exporters used earlier for estimating Eq. (38). Accounting for
α1 = 1/Θ − 1 this implies 70 diﬀerent values for α1. All thus computed values for α1 lie below
the interval of estimated values for α1 from Eq. (38). The largest computed α1 in Eq. (40) –
i.e. the one closest to the interval (−0.815,−0.608) – is generated by χ¯ = 0.05, and hence we
pick the α1-estimate from Eq. (38) that is based on the subgroup of largest exporters that make
up 5 percent of the total firm population. The corresponding estimate is αˆ1 = −0.693 with a
standard error of 0.002.22
This estimate of α1 is close to the Pareto shape parameter reported by Arkolakis (2010) for
foreign sales of French exporters, which amounts to −0.67 when considering uniform fixed costs
and to −0.61 when allowing for fixed costs to be firm-specific. For χ¯ = 0.050, we estimate a
shape parameter of the skilled wage distribution of βˆ1 = −0.047 with a standard error of 0.001.
The parameter estimates for β1 lie in the interval (−0.085,−0.035), which suggests that the
estimate of β1 is not too sensitive to the specific choice of χ¯.
With the parameter estimates αˆ1 and βˆ1 at hand, we can in a next step use the definitions of
∆ and Φ to solve for estimates of the shape parameters of the baseline productivity distribution,
g, and of the ability distribution of skilled workers, s:
gˆ = −
[νˆ + (1− νˆ)η](σˆ − 1)
αˆ1 + νˆ(σˆ − 1)βˆ1
= 3.975 + 4.546η, (41)
sˆ = −
[νˆ + (1− νˆ)η](σˆ − 1)[1 − βˆ1 + αˆ1]
αˆ1 + νˆ(σˆ − 1)βˆ1
= 1.409 + 1.612η. (42)
The positive impact of η on gˆ and sˆ is intuitive. All other things equal, a larger parameter η
increases the marginal cost diﬀerential of two firms resulting from a diﬀerential in their baseline
productivities, according to Eq. (7). However, this increase in the marginal cost gap is only
compatible with a given revenue profile over percentiles and thus a given estimate αˆ1, if it is
compensated by a lower relative frequency of high productivity producers and thus a lower
(higher) average productivity in high (low) percentiles of the revenue distribution of exporters.
The reasoning behind the positive relationship of η and s is similar. A larger η allows productivity
diﬀerences to exert a larger impact on relative skilled wages (because higher wages become a
22We have checked that χ¯ < (ϕx2)
−g holds for the estimated values of ϕx2 and g, as required by the model.
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less important cost factor for firms). However, this is compatible with a given skilled wage
profile over percentiles and thus a given estimate of βˆ1 only, if the higher skilled wage gap is
compensated by a lower relative frequency of skilled workers with high abilities. From Eqs. (41)
and (42) we can also infer that sˆ/gˆ = 1− βˆ1 + αˆ1 = 0.355 is independent of η.
One could alternatively formulate the least-squares problems to estimate the parameters
{ν}, {σ}, {t0}, {α0,α1}, and {β0,β1} in terms of a generalised-method-of-moments (GMM)
approach either separately for each parameter type or for all parameters jointly. When allowing
for heteroskedasticity, the GMM estimator is fully equivalent to OLS for each equation as above
(see Greene, 2003, p. 221).
Step two: Estimation of the two remaining parameters η and u
Together with the parameter restrictions from the model, the estimates from above confine the
parameter space of possible combinations of η and u. To see this, note first that condition
s > g + 1− ησ is equivalent to the constraint
η >
αˆ1
αˆ1 + βˆ1(σˆ − 1)
≡ η = 0.669. (43)
Furthermore, combining the conditions u < g+1−ησ and u+η−1 > 0 establishes 1−η < g+1−ησ
and, thus, η < η¯, with
η¯ ≡
⎧⎨⎩−
νˆ
1−νˆ+αˆ1+νˆ(σˆ−1)βˆ1
≡ η¯0 if η¯0 ∈ (0, 1)
1 otherwise
. (44)
For the parameter estimates from above, we have ηˆ0 < 0. This establishes (0.669, 1) as the
relevant domain of η. For parameter u, the relevant domain is confined by the conditions
u + η − 1 > 0 and u < g + 1 − ησ, and this domain is not empty, if η < η¯. With our
parametrisation, we then have u ∈ (1− η, 4.975 − 3.715η).
To select a unique (η, u)-tuple from the possible parameter space, we conduct the following
grid-search procedure. We first divide the interval [η + 10−7, 1 − 10−7] into 100 symmetric
subintervals and then pick the bounds of these subintervals as possible parametrisations of η.
This gives 101 η-values. For all of these η-values, we then specify a u-interval [1− η+10−7, gˆ+
1−ησˆ−10−7], divide this interval into 100 subintervals, and choose their boundaries as possible
parametrisations of u. This gives 101 u-values for each η parameter. Altogether, there are then
10,201 candidate (η, u)-tuples that are supported by our model. For all these parameter tuples,
we solve for ϕx1 and λ as described in the theory section, and then compute Theil subindices Tu
and Tw = T −Tb as measures of wage inequality for unskilled workers and the within component
of the overall wage inequality of skilled and unskilled workers.
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Using the definitions
tu(wu) ≡
Luwu
Wu
ln
Luwu
Wu
, t(w) ≡
(Lu + Ls)w
Wu +Ws
ln
(Lu + Ls)w
Wu +Ws
, (45)
we can express the two Theil subindices as functions of tu(wu) and t(w) over the pool of unskilled
workers and the pool of all workers, respectively:
Tu =
∫ wu
wu
tu(wu)dFu(wu), Tw =
∫ w
w
t(w)dF (w), (46)
where dFu(wu) is the relative frequency of an unskilled wage of wu in the interval (wu, wu), and
dF (w) is the relative frequency of any (skilled or unskilled) wage w in the interval (w,w). The
Theil subindices Tu and Tw can therefore be interpreted as two data moments that are based on
individual wage observations, and we can use them as inputs for a GMM estimation of η and u
based on the aforementioned grid.23
Whereas targeting two data moments would be suﬃcient in principle for estimating the two
remaining parameters u and η, we face the problem that Tu and Tw are collinear in our model if
λ = 1. This implies that our econometric model would be underidentified if λ = 1, and, hence,
we would not be able to determine a unique combination of η and u in this case. To overcome
this problem, we target the average wage of unskilled workers with an ability higher than ϕx2 ,
denoted w˜xu, relative to the average wage of all unskilled workers, Wu/Lu,
Luw˜xu
Wu
=
(ϕx2)
1−ηλν(u+η/ν−s)
1 + (ϕu1 )
u+η−1ωu
, (47)
as an additional data moment. With the solution for the general equilibrium at hand, we can
compute theory-consistent measures of Luw˜xu/Wu for all (η, u)-combinations. Crucially, if λ = 1
(and, thus, ωu = 0), Eq. (47) reduces to Luw˜xu/Wu = (ϕ
x
2)
1−η, and, hence, only depends on η
but not on u. This implies that Luw˜xu/Wu and Tu are not collinear, if λ = 1. Finally, we can
express Luw˜xu/Wu as the (conditional) mean of observables:
Luw˜xu
Wu
=
∫ wu
wxu
Luwu
Wu
dF xu (wu), (48)
where wxu is the lower bound of wages received by unskilled workers with abilities β ≥ ϕ
x
2 and
dF xu (w
x
u) is the conditional relative frequency of unskilled wages over interval (w
x
u/wu), i.e.,
dF xu (wu) = dFu(wu)/[1− Fu(w
x
u)], with 1− Fu(w
x
u) = (φ
x
2)
−u.
Taking stock, we have identified three moment conditions in two parameters, which we denote
by mu(η, u) for targeting Tu, mw(η, u) for targeting Tw, and mr(η, u) for targeting the average
23To be consistent with the previous estimations and with the results of the model, when constructing t(w) we
impose the restriction that firms pay the same (average) wage to all their skilled workers.
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wage of skilled workers with β > ϕx2 . We select the preferred (η, u)-tuple as the solution to
argmin
(η,u)
m′Ψm, (49)
wherem is a 3x1 vector of the moment conditions and Ψ is a 3x3 positive semi-definite moments
weighting matrix. To give more precisely measured moments a higher weight in the estimation,
we weigh the moment conditions by the inverse variance of the data underlying the construction
of the respective averages and estimate parameter values of ηˆ = 0.987 and uˆ = 0.052 with
standard errors of 0.001 and 0.005, respectively. These parameter estimates represent interior
solutions, i.e. neither ηˆ nor uˆ lie at their interval bounds, and they support an outcome with
λ = 1 and, thus, a pooling of unskilled workers over all firms.24
To get an intuition for the estimates of η and u, one should bear in mind that for λ = 1, ηˆ is
disciplined by the third moment condition, which links average wages from an upper tail of the
ability distribution of unskilled workers in the model to the average wage of unskilled workers
employed by high productivity firms in the data. Since the ability distribution in the model
does not have an upper bound, a good fit of the model with this specific moment requires that
the elasticity of the wage profile of unskilled workers is suﬃciently small, so that the impact
of ability diﬀerences on wages is not too high.25 The low estimate of u is then the result of
bringing a high ηˆ and thus a relatively flat wage profile in accordance with the sizable Theil
index of unskilled workers’ incomes observed in the data. The parameter estimate of η allows us
to compute implied estimates of the shape parameters of the productivity distribution and the
ability distribution of skilled workers, which we estimate at gˆ = 8.461 and sˆ = 3.000, respectively.
We complete the discussion in this section by summarising the point estimates for our pa-
rameters and the main composites of these parameters in Table 2. To account for remaining
interdependencies of the parameter estimates, which are not adequately addressed by OLS, we
have computed standard errors from 50 bootstrap samples of the data, which diﬀer slightly
from the estimated standard errors in the text. We report the bootstrapped standard errors in
parentheses.
5.2 Model fit
With the parameter estimates derived in the previous section, we can quantify economy-wide
inequality and its components, and contrast the respective results with the empirical patterns
in our dataset. Table 3 reports the computed and observed measures of inequality (with boot-
strapped standard errors in parentheses). Our model underestimates the various forms of wage
24The weighting matrix only matters if there are more moment conditions than parameters to estimate, which
is the case in our application if λ > 1. Hence, with λ = 1, our parameter estimates do not change when giving
equal weight to all moment conditions, or when using the inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix of
the moment conditions for specifying Ψ, as recommended by Hansen (1982).
25Note that in our model 1 − η captures the eﬀect of abilities on eﬀective firm productivity conditional on
abilities being higher than the minimum viable level. Therefore our high estimate for η is compatible with the
underlying model assumption that abilities are important for determining this productivity.
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Table 2: Parameter estimates
parameter values composite values
ν 0.466 (0.002) ∆ 0.807 (0.066)
σ 8.261 (2.615) Φ 0.399 (0.121)
τ 1.044 (0.036) Θ 3.253 (0.531)
g 8.461 (2.411) Γ 1.340 (0.022)
s 3.000 (0.993) Ξ 1.098 (0.151)
η 0.987 (0.031)
u 0.052 (0.108)
inequality in our dataset, except for the inequality within the group of unskilled workers, which
has been targeted in the GMM estimation. Although the downward bias in the Ts is sizable, the
model predicts the correct ranking of Ts and Tu. Furthermore, from the inspection of T , we see
that despite abstracting from other sources of wage inequality, such as rent-sharing, our model
of ability diﬀerences of workers can explain a substantial share of overall wage inequality in our
dataset.
Table 3: Income inequality
observed computed
Ts 0.035 0.017 (0.008)
Tu 0.045 0.047 (0.006)
Tw 0.040 0.033 (0.005)
Tb 0.016 0.008 (0.001)
T 0.056 0.041 (0.005)
To illustrate how the model performs in explaining the observed distribution of wages, we
plot observed against computed wages in Figure 4. For illustrative purposes, we have determined
averages of 100 wage groups (in logs) and normalised these averages by dividing them by their
median value. The observed values come directly from the data and the computed ones are
determined by calculating for 100 income groups lower and upper ability bounds, determining
the average wages within these bounds using the wage profiles from our model, and dividing the
thus determined averages by their median. In Panel A, we show to what extent our model is
capable of capturing the wage profile for skilled and unskilled workers in the data. Black dots
refer to skilled wages and grey diamonds to unskilled wages, respectively. Clearly, by excluding
sources of wage inequality other than ability diﬀerences, our model cannot explain all of the
within-group variation of individual wages in the data. Accounting for the scarcity of high
abilities in the population of skilled workers helps targeting wage diﬀerences in the middle of
the wage distribution, but it cannot explain the strong variation of wages at the tails of the
distribution.
In Panel B, we further elaborate to what extent accounting for the scarcity of high-ability
skilled workers improves the aptitude of our model to explain the variation of skilled wages in
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Figure 4: Observed versus computed wages
the data. For this purpose, we contrast the separating equilibrium supported by the data (black
dots) with a pooling equilibrium of skilled workers, featuring an elasticity of the wage profile
that is equal to 1 − η. Relying on our parameter estimates, we see that ignoring the scarcity
of high abilities would lead our model to underestimate the high variation of skilled wages to
a much larger extent than the preferred specification with a separating equilibrium of skilled
workers.
Figure 4 suggests that accounting for the the scarcity of skilled workers with high abilities
improves the fit of the data by our model. We can go one step further and quantify this
improvement by computing the divergence between the observed and computed distribution of
skilled wages. For this purpose, we can rely on an index of divergence introduced by Kullback and
Leibler (1951), which measures the information loss from approximating the true distribution
of wages by the distribution from our model.26 The Kullback-Leibler divergence gives the
expected logarithmic diﬀerence between the true probability distribution of variable x, P̂ r(x),
and its theoretical approximation, Pr(x). For discrete distributions it is given by
D(P̂ r||Pr) =
∑
x
P̂ r(x)
[
ln
(
P̂ r(x)
Pr(x)
)]
, (50)
where P̂ r(x) = 0 whenever Pr(x) = 0. The Kullback-Leibler divergence takes on a value of zero,
if two distributions are identical, and it is larger than zero otherwise. Lower values of D(P̂ r||Pr)
indicate a smaller information loss and thus a better approximation of the true distribution of
x by Pr.
We can now associate xi with a realization of wages in wage group i, and therefore interpret
P̂ r(xi) as the probability that a random draw of a skilled worker from our dataset gives an
observation in wage group i. Since the 100 wage groups are disjoint and of (almost) equal size,
26Mra´zova et al. (2016) provide a detailed discussion about the properties of the Kullback-Leibler index and its
relationship to Shannon’s (1948) entropy.
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we have P̂ r(xi) ≈ 0.01 for all i ∈ {1, ..., 100}.27 For constructing the values of Pr(xi), we
consider observed lower and upper bounds of skilled wages for each wage group and construct
ability bounds from the wage profile of skilled workers in our model. The thus computed ability
bounds are then used to determine Pr(xi) =
∫ αi
αi
α−sdS(α). Using P̂ r(xi) and Pr(xi) in Eq.
(50) gives
Ds(P̂ r||Pr) = 0.001 and Dp(P̂ r||Pr) = 2.300 (51)
for the baseline specification with a separating equilibrium for skilled workers and a counterfac-
tual situation with a pooling equilibrium of skilled workers, respectively. The sizable diﬀerence
between the two divergence measures confirms our conjecture from Figure 4 that accounting
for the scarcity of high-ability skilled workers improves the fit of our model with the observed
distribution of skilled wages considerably.
6 The exporter wage premium and its eﬀect on inequality
When it comes to quantifying the exporter wage premium, the structural approach employed in
this paper, unlike previous studies, allows us to compute skill-specific premia. The parameter
estimates derived above imply u + η/ν − s < 0, which means that there is no exporter wage
premium for unskilled workers. By contrast, the exporter premium for skilled workers is large and
amounts to 12.137 percent. Weighting the skill-specific wage premia by the share of skilled and
unskilled workers employed in exporting firms, we arrive at an average exporter wage premium of
4.896 percent. This average is at the lower bound of results from previous empirical work, which
reports estimates that vary between four and eighteen percent (cf. Bernard and Jensen, 1999;
Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; Frias et al., 2009; Egger et al., 2013; Hauptmann and Schmerer,
2013), when not distinguishing between skilled and unskilled workers. Using the same dataset
as we do, Klein et al. (2013) estimate an average exporter wage premium for Germany of 4.4
percent in a reduced-form approach.28
To provide a better understanding of how the existence of an exporter wage premium aﬀects
economy-wide wage inequality in our model, we can quantify the impact of trade on wage
inequality in Germany by contrasting the Theil indices for the observed exposure to trade with
the respective indices in the counterfactual situation without any trade. Moving the German
economy to autarky means eliminating the exporter wage premium by design. Since exporters
do not pay a wage premium to their unskilled workforce, this comparative static exercise only
aﬀects the wage distribution of skilled workers, making it more equal. Specifically, the Theil
index measuring the wage distribution of skilled wages, Ts, declines by 35.975 percent, whereas
27Due to indivisibilities, small deviations from P̂ r(xi) = 0.01 are possible.
28Schank et al. (2007) report much smaller exporter wage premia for Germany. According to their findings,
plants with an export to sales ratio of 60 percent pay 1.8 percent higher wages to unskilled and 0.9 percent higher
wages to skilled workers than otherwise identical non-exporting plants.
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the overall wage inequality, as measured by the Theil index T , falls by 6.783 percent.29
As an alternative counterfactual exercise, we consider the case of abolishing all variable
trade costs, while leaving the fixed export costs constant. At the observed exposure to trade,
χ = 0.317, we can compute an estimate of fx/fe by employing the parameter estimates in Eq.
(27). This establishes f̂x/fe = 0.414. Equipped with this fixed cost ratio, we can then apply
the implicit function in Eq. (27) to compute the share of exporting firms if τ falls to unity. This
gives χ = 0.466 and indicates that eliminating iceberg trade costs has a considerable eﬀect on
the share of exporting firms. Regarding the eﬀect on inequality, there are now two potentially
counteracting eﬀects: An increase in the exporter wage premium, which increases inequality,
and an increase in the share of the skilled worker population being paid this premium. The
latter eﬀect is non-monotonic, becoming negative if χ is suﬃciently large. In line with this
reasoning, the distributional eﬀects of our counterfactual exercise are small. The exporter wage
premium for skilled workers would increase by 2.720 percent and would be counteracted and
dominated by an increase in the share of skilled workers employed by exporters, so that wage
inequality within the group of skilled workers would be reduced if variable trade costs fell to
zero. Specifically, we find that the Theil index of skilled workers falls by 1.729 percent, whereas
the Theil index for all workers falls by 0.326 percent.
7 Robustness analysis
In this section, we analyse the robustness of our estimation results regarding the distinction of
skilled and unskilled workers. For this purpose, we consider two alternative definitions of skill
groups: a narrow definition, in which we associate the skilled with those workers who hold a
college or university degree; and a broad definition, in which we classify only workers as unskilled
if their highest degree attained is one of a lower secondary education and if they lack vocational
training. The parameter estimates for these two alternative skill definitions are summarised in
Table 4. To facilitate the discussion, we have added our estimates from the benchmark scenario,
whereas we do not report the estimates for σ, τ , and Θ, as they are independent of the chosen
skill definitions.
From the ν-estimates in Table 4, we can conclude that the considered changes in the skill def-
initions have large eﬀects on the income shares of the two skill groups. However, the eﬀects on
the other parameter estimates are rather small and, relying on the bootstrapped standard errors
from the benchmark scenario, the diﬀerences in most cases are statistically insignificant. Fur-
thermore, where a direct economic interpretation of the parameters is applicable, the observed
changes in the point estimates seem to be well in line with standard economic reasoning.
For instance, classifying as skilled only those workers who hold a college or university degree
makes abilities of skilled workers more similar, and therefore leads to a higher estimate of s,
29With constant expenditure shares due to the Cobb-Douglas technology and full employment of both skill
types, there are no eﬀects on the relative return of skilled to unskilled workers on average, leaving the between
component of the Theil index, Tb, unaﬀected.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates for alternative skill definitions
parameter benchmark narrow skill broad skill
ν 0.466 0.106 0.841
g 8.461 9.914 7.438
s 3.000 3.480 2.632
η 0.987 0.991 0.997
u 0.052 0.037 0.013
∆ 0.807 0.946 0.709
Φ 0.399 0.432 0.345
Γ 1.340 1.346 1.326
Ξ 1.098 0.630 1.241
whose value approaches infinity in the limiting case of fully symmetric agents. Of course, one
would also expect a higher elasticity of the skilled wage schedule when skilled workers with high
abilities are a scarcer resource, i.e., when s is higher. This reasoning is in line with a higher
estimate of Φ for the scenario with a narrow skill definition. Finally, since the markup per
eﬃciency unit paid to skilled workers with higher abilities lowers the eﬀect that diﬀerences in
the baseline productivity exert on marginal costs, one would expect that the elasticity of firm-
level marginal costs with respect to productivity declines, when skilled workers become a less
important cost factor as fewer of them are employed by firms. This conjecture is confirmed by
a higher estimate of ∆ when considering the narrow skill definition.
Choosing alternative definitions of skill groups also aﬀects the observed measures of wage
inequality. This can be seen from Table 5, where we report the various Theil indices discussed
above for the benchmark scenario as well as the two alternative skill definitions. As expected,
the broader the definition of a skill group is, the larger is the wage inequality in this group.
Interestingly, we observe for both the narrower as well as the broader skill definition that the
share of wage inequality attributed to the within component increases in the data. Our model is
not overly successful in capturing the between-component of the Theil index, but it does a fairly
good job in predicting wage inequality within the subgroups of skilled and unskilled workers, in
particular when considering the narrow skill definition.
Table 5: Theil indices for alternative skill definitions
benchmark narrow skill def. broad skill def.
observed computed observed computed observed computed
Ts 0.035 0.017 0.029 0.028 0.040 0.014
Tu 0.045 0.047 0.058 0.049 0.038 0.044
Tw 0.040 0.033 0.053 0.047 0.040 0.018
Tb 0.016 0.008 0.016 0.001 0.007 0.044
T 0.056 0.041 0.069 0.048 0.047 0.063
With the parameter estimates from Table 4 at hand, we can finally compute the exporter
wage premium. For skilled workers this premium amounts to 34.367 percent when considering a
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narrow skill definition, which is almost three times as high as in the benchmark scenario. Since
u + η/ν − s > 0 holds, the necessary condition for an exporter wage premium for unskilled
workers is met, but we estimate λ¯ < 1, which enforces λ = 1 and thus ωu = 0. The average
exporter wage premium for all skilled and unskilled workers amounts to 4.520 percent for the
narrow skill definition, which is of the same order of magnitude as in the benchmark scenario.
Relying on the broad skill definition, we estimate an exporter wage premium for skilled workers
of 7.244 percent. Whereas u+η/ν−s < 0 does not leave scope for an exporter wage premium of
unskilled workers, the average exporter wage premium for skilled and unskilled workers amounts
to 4.930. This confirms the insight from above that the estimate of the average exporter wage
premium is robust to changes in the definition of skill groups.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed a structural empirical model of an open economy in which the populations of
firms and workers are heterogeneous. Firms hire skilled and unskilled workers for production, and
firms with a higher (innate) baseline productivity require skilled and unskilled workers of higher
ability, leading them to pay higher wages for both types of workers. With more productive firms
selecting into exporting, our model allows for the existence of an exporter wage premium due
to extra demand by exporting firms for high-ability workers that are in fixed supply. Whether
or not an exporter wage premium materialises in our model depends on the supply of and the
demand for workers with high abilities, and, therefore, on the ability distributions of skilled
and unskilled workers as well as on the baseline productivity distribution of firms. With two
types of workers present, we can decompose the exporter wage premium into its skill-specific
components.
We structurally estimate the parameters of the model using the matched employer-employee
dataset LIAB of the Institute for Employment Reserch (IAB), which provides detailed informa-
tion on German firms and workers for the years 1996 to 2008. The dataset provides information
on the educational background of workers as well as their employment as blue- or white-collar
workers. We use this information to find the empirical equivalent of the skilled and unskilled
worker categories in our theoretical model. Using the estimated parameter values, we find an
average exporter wage premium of about 5 percent, which is within the range of values reported
in other studies. But we also find that this average masks a lot of heterogeneity, with export-
ing firms paying no wage premium to their unskilled workers, while the exporter wage premium
for the subgroup of skilled workers is higher than 12 percent. This suggests to us that it is
empirically relevant to dissect the exporter wage premium as we have done in this paper.
Through its eﬀect on the exporter wage premium, trade in the proposed model has consider-
able eﬀects on the economy-wide distribution of income, which is more unequal in the open than
the closed economy. However, the respective eﬀects are not monotonic, implying that traveling
further along the road of trade liberalisation will eventually reduce income inequality, despite
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an increase in the exporter wage premium. The reason for this is that less productive firms start
exporting, employing workers with lower abilities and thus from lower segments of the wage dis-
tribution. In two extensions, we show that the main insights from our analysis are robust to
quite substantial changes in the definitions of skilled and unskilled workers.
References
Alda, H., S. Bender, and H. Gartner (2005): “The Linked Employer-employee Dataset
Created from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Process-produced Data of the IAB
(LIAB),” Schmollers Jahrbuch, 125, 327–336.
Amiti, M. and D. R. Davis (2012): “Trade, Firms, and Wages: Theory and Evidence,” Review
of Economic Studies, 79, 1–36.
Anderson, J. E. and E. van Wincoop (2004): “Trade Costs,” Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 42, 691–751.
Antra`s, P., T. Fort, and F. Tintelnot (2017): “The Margins of Global Sourcing: Theory
and Evidence from U.S. Firms,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Arkolakis, C. (2010): “Market Penetration Costs and the New Consumers Margin in Inter-
national Trade,” Journal of Political Economy, 118, 1151–1199.
Armenter, R. and M. Koren (2015): “Economies of Scale and the Size of Exporters,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 13, 482–511.
Bernard, A. B. and J. B. Jensen (1995): “Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. Manufactur-
ing: 1976-1987,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 67–119.
——— (1999): “Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Eﬀect, or Both?” Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 47, 1–25.
Bernard, A. B., J. B. Jensen, S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2012): “The Empirics
of Firm Heterogeneity and International Trade,” Annual Review of Economics, 4, 283–313.
Broda, C. and D. E. Weinstein (2006): “Globalization and the Gains from Variety,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 121, 541–585.
Cos¸ar, A. K., N. Guner, and J. Tybout (2016): “Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage
Distributions in an Open Economy.” American Economic Review, 106, 625–663.
Davis, D. R. and J. Harrigan (2011): “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade Liberalization,”
Journal of International Economics, 84, 26–36.
Egger, H., P. Egger, and U. Kreickemeier (2013): “Trade, Wages, and Profits,” European
Economic Review, 64, 332 – 350.
Egger, H. and U. Kreickemeier (2009): “Firm Heterogeneity And The Labor Market Eﬀects
Of Trade Liberalization,” International Economic Review, 50, 187–216.
——— (2012): “Fairness, Trade, and Inequality,” Journal of International Economics, 86, 184–
196.
Feenstra, R. C. and G. H. Hanson (1997): “Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages:
Evidence from Mexico’s Maquiladoras,” Journal of International Economics, 42, 371–393.
36
Frias, J. A., D. S. Kaplan, and E. Verhoogen (2009): “Exports and Wage Premia:
Evidence from Mexican Employer-Employee Data,” unpublished manuscript.
Ghironi, F. and M. J. Melitz (2005): “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics
with Heterogeneous Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 865–915.
Greene, W. (2003): Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 5th ed.
Hansen, L. P. (1982): “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estima-
tors,” Econometrica, 50, 1029–1054.
Harrigan, J. and A. Reshef (2015): “Skill Biased Heterogeneous Firms, Trade Liberalization
and the Skill Premium,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 48, 1024–1066.
Hauptmann, A. and H.-J. Schmerer (2013): “Do Exporters Pay Fair-wage Premiums?”
Economics Letters, 121, 179–182.
Helpman, E., O. Itskhoki, and S. Redding (2010): “Inequality and Unemployment in a
Global Economy,” Econometrica, 78, 1239–1283.
Irrazabal, A., A. Moxnes, and K. H. Ulltveit-Moe (2013): “Heterogeneous Firms or
Heterogeneous Workers? Implications for Exporter Premiums and the Gains from Trade,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 839–849.
Klein, M., C. Moser, and D. Urban (2013): “Exporting, Skills and Wage Inequality,”
Labour Economics, 25, 76–85.
Kullback, S. and R. A. Leibler (1951): “On Information and Suﬃciency,” The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 22, 79–86.
Mayer, T. and G. I. Ottaviano (2008): “The Happy Few: The Internationalisation of
European Firms – New Facts based on Firm-level Evidence,” Intereconomics, 44, 149–158.
Melitz, M. J. (2003): “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71, 1695–1725.
Milner, C. and D. McGowan (2013): “Trade Costs and Trade Composition,” Economic
Inquiry, 51, 1886–1902.
Mra´zova, M., P. Neary, and M. Parenti (2016): “Sales and Markup Dispersion: Theory
and Empirics,” Unpublished Manuscript.
Novy, D. (2013): “Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data,”
Economic Inquiry, 51, 101–121.
Sampson, T. (2014): “Selection into Trade and Wage Inequality,” American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 6, 157–202.
Schafer, J. (1997): Analysis of Incomplete Multivariate Data, Chapman and Hall/CRC.
Schank, T., C. Schnabel, and J. Wagner (2007): “Do Exporters Really Pay Higher Wages?
First Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data,” Journal of International
Economics, 72, 52–74.
Shannon, C. E. (1948): “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System Technical
Journal, 27, 379–423.
37
Shorrocks, A. F. (1980): “The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures,”
Econometrica, 48, 613–625.
Su¨dekum, J. (2008): “Convergence of the Skill Composition Across German Regions,” Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 38.
38
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that with pooling of unskilled workers
over all firms, s ≥ g + 1 − ησ is necessary and suﬃcient for segmentation of skilled workers by
firms. Second, we show that with segmentation of skilled workers by firms u < g + 1 − ησ is
suﬃcient for pooling of unskilled workers by firms. Together, the two conditions then establish
Lemma 1.
Let us first consider pooling of unskilled workers over all firms. In this case, wage diﬀerences
reflect ability diﬀerences, and the wage paid to a worker with ability β are linked to the wage
paid to the least able unskilled worker, with ability βc, who finds employment in the least
productive firm, featuring productivity ϕc, by wu(β) = (β/βc)1−ηwu(βc). Let us further assume
that skilled workers were also just compensated for their ability diﬀerences, implying that skilled
wages would be given by ws(α) = (α/αc)1−ηws(αc), with αc = ϕc. In this case, our model would
mimic a textbook Melitz (2003) model with the productivity of firms given by ϕη and, since all
producers pay the same wage per eﬃciency unit for labour input, marginal costs are inversely
proportional to to this productivity. If firms in such a situation were only employing those
skilled workers that exactly match their productivity threshold, i.e., if α = ϕ would hold for
all ϕ, the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas technology would give rise to ws(v)ls(v) = νc(v)q(v).
Accordingly, firm-level demand for skilled workers could be expressed by ls(v) = (ϕ(v)/ϕc)ησ−1lcs,
where lcs and ϕc refer to the number of skilled workers employed by and the baseline productivity
of the least productive producer, respectively. Suppressing firm index v, total labour demand of
all firms with productivity higher than ϕ¯ would be given by Nlcs[g/(g − ησ + 1)](ϕ¯/ϕ
c)ησ−g−1,
where N is the mass of producers. The supply of workers with ability higher than ϕ¯ equals
Lsϕ¯−s, and labour market clearing at ϕ¯ = ϕc therefore requires Nlcs[g/(g − ησ + 1)] = Lsϕ
−s
c .
Putting together, we find that under labour market clearing g+1− ησ > s would lead to excess
supply of skilled workers with ability β > ϕc in the knife-edge case, in which firms employ skilled
workers whose ability corresponds to their productivity threshold and pay the same wage per
eﬃciency unit for either skill group. This would result in firms hiring workers with abilities
above their productivity threshold and thus establish pooling of skilled workers over firms. In
contrast, s > g + 1 − ησ would lead to excess demand of skilled workers in the thus described
knife-edge case and ultimately lead to a separating equilibrium and a skilled wage profile that
is steeper than required for a compensation of ability diﬀerences.
Let us now consider segmentation of skilled workers by firms and let us hypothesise that
firms hire only unskilled workers that exactly match their technology requirements, β = ϕ,
paying them a wage of wu(β) = (β/βc)1−ηwu(βc). Using Eqs. (5) and (9) from Section 2.3, we
can write firm-level employment of unskilled workers as lu(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕc)∆(σ−1)−1+η lu(ϕc). The
demand for unskilled workers of firms with productivity ϕ > ϕ¯ is given by Nlcu[g/(g −∆(σ −
1)− 1 + η)](ϕ¯/ϕc)∆(σ−1)−g+1−η , whereas supply of unskilled workers with ability higher than ϕ¯
equals Luϕ¯−u. With labour market clearing at ϕ¯ = ϕc, we find that there is an excess supply
of unskilled workers in the knife-edge case considered here, if u < g − ∆(σ − 1) + 1 − η. In
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this case, we have pooling of unskilled workers over all firms, whereas there is segmentation of
unskilled workers over firms if u > g − ∆(σ − 1) + 1 − η. Noting further that ∆ − η ≤ 0 is
established by s ≥ g + 1 − ησ, one can confirm that the parameter constraint in Assumption
1 establishes pooling of unskilled workers if there is segmentation of skilled workers by firms.
Putting together, we can thus conclude that with this parameter constraint the only possible
outcome consistent with labour market clearing is one with segmentation of skilled workers by
firms and pooling of unskilled workers over firms. This completes the proof.
A.2 Wage profiles of skilled and unskilled workers in the open economy
Let us consider the productivity thresholds ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2 as defined in the main text. Then, for
all ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2), exporters and non-exporters coexist, and, hence, it must be true that (1 +
τ1−σ)r(ϕ)/σ − r(ϕ)/σ = fx and thus τ1−σr(ϕ) = σfx. Accounting for r(ϕ) = p(ϕ)q(ϕ) and Eq.
(8) from the closed economy, we obtain the revenue profile for the open economy:
r(ϕ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ϕ(σ−1)∆r(1) if ϕ < ϕx1
(ϕx1)
(σ−1)∆r(1) if ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2)
ϕ(σ−1)∆
(
ϕx1
ϕx2
)(σ−1)∆
r(1) if ϕ ≥ ϕx2
(A.1)
Furthermore, the wage profile of skilled workers can be expressed as
ws(ϕ)
ws(1)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ϕ−
g
Θ+s if ϕ < ϕx1
ϕ−g+s[1 + τ1−σχ(ϕ)](ϕx1 )
gΘ−1Θ if ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2)
ϕ−
g
Θ+s[1 + τ1−σ]
(
ϕx1
ϕx2
)gΘ−1Θ
if ϕ ≥ ϕx2
(A.2)
where we have used Eq. (8) together with [ν + (1 − ν)η]/ν −∆/ν = −g/Θ + s, and χ(ϕ) = 0
if ϕ < ϕx1 to establish the first line in Eq. (A.2). The second line is obtained from our previous
result that r(ϕ) = r(ϕx1) holds for all ϕ ∈ [ϕ
x
1 ,ϕ
x
2) and the insight that a fraction χ(ϕ) of firms
of productivity ϕ exports over productivity interval [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2). Skilled labour demand of firms
with productivity ϕ ∈ (ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2 ] is therefore proportional to [1+ τ
1−σχ(ϕ)]ws(ϕ), and these firms
exist with density gϕ−g−1, whereas skilled workers with ability α = ϕ exist with density sϕ−s−1.
Equalising supply and demand for all ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
x
2) therefore requires a wage profile over this
productivity subdomain as given by the second line of (A.2). Finally, the third line is derived
in analogy to the first line, accounting for χ(ϕ) = 1 if ϕ ≥ ϕx2 .
To determine the wage profile of unskilled workers in Eq. (17), let us assume that there
exists an interval [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ), such that there is segmentation of unskilled workers by firms over
this productivity interval. Under Assumption 1 and a Cobb-Douglas technology, it is immediate
that ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ∈ (ϕ
x
1 ,ϕ
x
2). From the discussion of the closed economy, it follows that wu(β)/wu(1) =
β1−η holds for all β < ϕu1 , establishing the first line in Eq. (17). With segmentation of skilled
and unskilled workers by firms, the marginal cost of a firm with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ) is
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given by
c(ϕ) = µ
wu(ϕ)
ϕ
(
ws(ϕ)
wu(ϕ)
)ν
, (A.3)
where β = ϕ and thus wu(β) = wu(ϕ) have been considered. From the assumption of a Cobb-
Douglas technology paired with the requirement that labour markets of skilled and unskilled
workers clear for all ϕ ∈ [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ), we further have
ν
1− ν
=
Lssϕ−s−1ws(ϕ)
Luuϕ−u−1wu(ϕ)
, (A.4)
implying c(ϕ) ∝ wu(ϕ)ϕ−1−ν(u−s). This establishes wu(β)/wu(ϕu1 ) = (ϕ/ϕ
u
1 )
1+ν(u−s) and thus
the second line in Eq. (17). For the third line, we can simply note that wu(β)/wu(ϕu2 ) =
(β/ϕu2 )
1−η holds for all β > ϕu2 , whereas wu(ϕ
u
2)/wu(1) = (ϕ
u
2/ϕ
u
1 )
ν(u+η/ν−s)(ϕu2 )
1−η follows
from above. This completes the formal characterisation of the two wage profiles.
A.3 Derivation of Eq. (18)
Provided that [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ) is not empty, we have to distinguish five productivity domains. The first
one is ϕ < ϕx1 and implies χ(ϕ) = 0. The second one is ϕ ≥ ϕ
x
2 and establishes χ(ϕ) = 1.
The third productivity domain is given by ϕ ∈ [ϕx1 ,ϕ
u
1 ). In this case, we have segmentation of
skilled workers and pooling of unskilled workers, establishing c(ϕ) ∝ ws(ϕ)νϕ−ν−η(1−ν). Since
we know from above that r(ϕ) = r(ϕx1) an thus c(ϕ) = c(ϕ
x
1) holds for all ϕ ∈ [ϕ
x
1 ,ϕ
x
2),
we can solve for ws(ϕ)/ws(ϕx1) = (ϕ/ϕ
x
1)
1+η(1−ν)/ν . Equating the latter with ws(ϕ)/ws(ϕx1) =
(ϕ/ϕx1 )
−g+s[1+τ1−σχ(ϕ)] from the second line of Eq. (A.2) establishes the second line in Eq. (18).
The fourth segment, we have to consider is one with ϕ ∈ [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ). In this case, we have
segmentation of skilled and unskilled workers by firms and thus c(ϕ) ∝ wu(ϕ)ϕ−1−ν(u−s) (see
above) or, equivalently, c(ϕ) ∝ ws(ϕ)ϕ−1−(1−ν)(s−u). Since we have c(ϕ) = c(ϕu1 ), we can solve
for ws(ϕ)/ws(ϕu1 ) = (ϕ/ϕ
u
1 )
1+(1−ν)(s−u). Accounting for ws(ϕu1 )/ws(ϕ
x
1) = (ϕ
u
1/ϕ
x
1)
1+η(1−ν)/ν ,
we obtain
ws(ϕ)
ws(ϕx1)
=
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
) ν+η(1−ν)
ν
(
ϕ
ϕu1
)1+(1−ν)(s−u)
(A.5)
Equating Eq. (A.5) with ws(ϕ)/ws(ϕx1) = (ϕ/ϕ
x
1 )
−g+s[1 + τ1−σχ(ϕ)] and accounting for 1 +
η(1 − ν)/ν + g − s = ∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]/ν gives the third line in Eq. (18). The fifth productivity
segment corresponds to ϕ ∈ [ϕu2 ,ϕ
x
2). In this case, we have c(ϕ) ∝ ws(ϕ)
νϕ−ν−η(1−ν) and, in
view of c(ϕ) = c(ϕu2 ): ws(ϕ)/ws(ϕ
u
2) = (ϕ/ϕ
u
2 )
1+η(1−ν)/ν . Evaluating Eq. (A.5) at ϕ = ϕu2 , we
obtain
ws(ϕ)
ws(ϕx1)
=
(
ϕ
ϕx1
) ν+η(1−ν)
ν
(
ϕu2
ϕu1
)(1−ν)[s−u−η/ν]
. (A.6)
Equating with ws(ϕ)/ws(ϕx1) = (ϕ/ϕ
x
1 )
−g+s[1+τ1−σχ(ϕ)] and accounting for 1+η(1−ν)/ν+g−
s = ∆[1+ν(σ−1)]/ν gives the fourth line in Eq. (18) and completes the formal characterisation
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of χ(ϕ).
A.4 Derivation of Eqs. (20), (21) and characterisation of ωs(λ), ωu(λ)
Let us first consider the unskilled wage bill in Eq. (21), which is given by
Wu = Luwu(1)
∫ ϕu1
1
β1−ηdU(β) + Luwu(1)
∫ ϕu2
ϕu1
(
β
ϕu1
)ν(u+η/ν−s)
β1−ηdU(β)
+ Luwu(1)
∫ ∞
ϕu2
(
ϕu2
ϕu1
)ν(u+η/ν−s)
β1−ηdU(β). (A.7)
Solving the integrals establishes Eq. (21), with
ωu(λ) ≡
ν(u+ η/ν − s)
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
[
1− λ1−νs−(1−ν)u
]
. (A.8)
It is immediate from Eq. (A.8) that ωu(λ) > 0 if u + η/ν − s > 0 and that ωu(1) = 0 holds in
this case.
Let us now turn to the wage bill of skilled workers, which is given by
Ws = Ls
∫ ∞
1
ws(ϕ)dS(ϕ)
= Lsws(1)
∫ ϕx1
1
ϕ−
g
Θ+sdS(ϕ) + Lsws(1)
∫ ϕu1
ϕx1
(
ϕ
ϕx1
)gΘ−1Θ
ϕ−g+sdS(ϕ)
+ Lsws(1)
∫ ϕu2
ϕu1
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)ν+(1−ν)η−sν
ν
(
ϕ
ϕu1
)1+g−νs−(1−ν)u
(ϕx1)
gΘ−1Θ ϕ−g+sdS(ϕ)
+ Lsws(1)
∫ ϕx2
ϕu2
(
ϕu2
ϕu1
)(1−ν)(s−η/ν−u) ( ϕ
ϕx1
) ν+(1−ν)η−sν
ν
(ϕx1)
gΘ−1
Θ ϕ−g+sdS(ϕ)
+ Lsws(1)
∫ ∞
ϕx2
(1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx1
ϕx2
)gΘ−1Θ
ϕ−
g
Θ+sdS(ϕ). (A.9)
Solving the integrals, the wage bill simplifies to Eq. (20), with
ωs(λ) ≡
gν −∆ν(σ − 1)
gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
⎡⎣1−(ϕu1
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν
ν
⎤⎦
+
g −∆(σ − 1)
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν
ν [
1− λ1−νs−(1−ν)u
]
+
gν −∆ν(σ − 1)
gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
λ(1−ν)(s−u−η/ν)
(
ϕu2
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν
ν
⎡⎣1− (ϕx2
ϕu2
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν
ν
⎤⎦
+ (1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx2
ϕx1
)−g
− 1, (A.10)
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Rearranging terms and accounting for Eqs. (9), (19), and (A.8), ωs(λ) simplifies to
ωs(λ) =
∆
gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
[
1− (1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx2
ϕx1
)−g]
−
(1− ν)[g −∆(σ − 1)]
gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν
ν
ωu(λ). (A.11)
Accounting for ω′u(λ) > 0 if u+η/ν−s > 0 from above, it follows from Eq. (A.11) that a higher λ
(and thus lower ωu) lowers the exporter wage premium of skilled workers. However, this captures
only the eﬀect through an increase in ωu, leaving aside additional eﬀects from adjustments in
productivity ratios ϕx2/ϕ
x
1 and ϕ
u
1/ϕ
x
1 . These additional eﬀects and their consequences for ωs
are addressed in the proof of Proposition 1.
A.5 Derivation of Eq. (26)
The share of exporting firms is given by
χ =
∫ ϕx2
ϕx1
χ(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕx2
dG(ϕ)
= τσ−1
{∫ ϕu1
ϕx1
(
ϕ
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
dG(ϕ) +
∫ ϕu2
ϕu1
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
(
ϕ
ϕu1
)1+g−νs−(1−ν)u
dG(ϕ)
+
∫ ϕx2
ϕu2
(
ϕu2
ϕu1
)(1−ν)(s−u−η/ν) ( ϕ
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
dG(ϕ) −
∫ ϕx2
ϕx1
dG(ϕ)
}
+
∫ ∞
ϕx2
dG(ϕ) (A.12)
Solving the integrals establishes
τ1−σ(ϕx1)
gχ =
Ξ
Ξ− 1
⎡⎣1− (ϕu1
ϕx1
) g(1−Ξ)
Ξ
⎤⎦+ g
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)g 1−ΞΞ (
1− λ1−νs−(1−ν)u
)
+
Ξ
Ξ− 1
λ(1−ν)(s−u−η/ν)
(
ϕu2
ϕx1
)g 1−ΞΞ [
1−
(
ϕx2
ϕu2
)g 1−ΞΞ ]
+ (1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx2
ϕx1
)−g
− 1. (A.13)
Accounting for the definition of Θ and substituting ωs(λ) from Eq. (A.11), gives Eq. (26). This
completes the proof.
A.6 Characterisation of implicit function Ω(ϕx1 ,λ; τ, fx) = 0
Solving Eq. (26) for ωs and considering the indiﬀerence condition for the marginal exporter in
Eq. (14), we can rewrite Eq. (24) as follows
R = ΘNr(1) + σNfx
{
χ− (Θ− 1)τσ−1(ϕx1)
−g
[
1− (1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx2
ϕx1
)−g]}
(A.14)
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Accounting for the free entry condition in the open economy, we can solve for the revenues of
the marginal exporter
r(1) =
σfe
Θ− (Θ− 1)(ϕx1 )
− gΘ
[
1− (1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx2
ϕx1
)−g] . (A.15)
Combining Eqs. (25) and (A.15) and accounting for Eq. (19) we can solve for the implicit function
Ω(ϕx1 ,λ; τ, fx) = Θ(ϕ
x
1)
−gΘ−1Θ
− (Θ− 1)(ϕx1)
−g
[
1− (1 + τ1−σ)1−Ξλ−Ξ(1−ν)[u+η/ν−s]
]
−
fe
fxτσ−1
= 0, (A.16)
which respects both free entry into the productivity lottery and indiﬀerence of the marginal
exporter with productivity ϕx1 > 1. Computing the partial derivatives of Ω(·) is straightforward
and thus left for the interested reader. In view of ∂Ω/∂ϕx1 < 0, ∂Ω/∂λ < 0, and limϕx1→∞Ω(·) =
−τ1−σfe/fx < 0, it is immediate that Ω(1, 1; τ, fx) > 0 is necessary (not suﬃcient) for an
outcome with Ω(·) = 0 that features ϕx1 > 1 and λ ≥ 1. This establishes the parameter
constraint in (28).
A.7 Characterisation of implicit function Φ(λ,ϕx1 ; τ) = 0
Implicit function Φ(λ,ϕx1 ; τ) = 0 only exists if there is segmentation of unskilled workers over
interval [ϕu1 ,ϕ
u
2 ] – presuming u + η/ν − s > 0 – and it is derived from the condition of labour
market clearing over the ability segments β ≤ ϕu1 and β ≥ ϕ
u
2 . Let us first consider labour
market clearing over ability segment β ≤ ϕu1 . Due to pooling of unskilled workers over firms
with productivity ϕ ≤ ϕu1 , demand for eﬃciency units of unskilled labour by these firms is given
by
LD1u =
(1− ν)
ν
sLsws(1)
wu(1)
Θ
g
{
1− (ϕx1)
− gΘ + (ϕx1)
− gΘ
Ξ
Θ
[
1−
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)g 1−ΞΞ ]}
, (A.17)
according to Eq. (18) and the observation that [ν(σ − 1)/σ]Nr(1)dG(1) = Lsws(1)dS(1). Eval-
uating Eq. (A.4) at ϕ = ϕu1 and setting labour demand equal to labour supply, LuΓ[1− (ϕ
u
1)
−uΓ ],
finally gives the labour market clearing condition
(ϕx1)
g
Θ −
[
Ξ
Θ
−
g
Θ
Γ
u
](
ϕu1
ϕx1
)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
ν
+
Ξ
Ξ− 1
∆
gν
g
Θ
Γ
u
(
ϕu1
ϕx1
)u+η/ν−s
(ϕx1)
u
Γ = 0. (A.18)
Following the same derivation steps as above for ability domain β ≥ ϕu2 , establishes market
clearing if
(
ϕx2
ϕu2
)g Ξ−1Ξ
=
Θ∆
gν
u
Γ(u+ η/ν − s)
≡ ξ. (A.19)
For u + η/ν − s > 0, the right-hand side of this expression is larger (smaller) than one if
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gν − ∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)] > (<)0, establishing ϕx2/ϕ
u
2 > 1. Combining market clearing conditions
(A.18) and (A.19) with Eq. (19) allows us to formulate the implicit function
Φ(ϕx1 ,λ; τ) = (ϕ
x
1)
g
Θ +
Ξ
Ξ− 1
∆
gν
[
1− ρ(λ; τ)∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν
]
−
g
Θ
Γ
u
ξ−
ν(u+η/ν−s)
gν−∆[1+ν(σ−1)] ρ(λ; τ)ν(u+η/ν−s)(ϕx1)
u
Γ = 0, (A.20)
where ρ(λ; τ) ≡ (1+τ1−σ)
1
∆[1+ν(σ−1)]λ
−
g+1−νs−(1−ν)u
∆[1+ν(σ−1)] has been considered. Since it is a tedious task
to show the properties of Φ(λ,ϕx1 ; τ), we have deferred a detailed discussion to a Supplement,
which is available upon request. There, we show that Φ(·) = 0 has a solution with ϕx1 ,λ > 1
if and only if, in addition to u + η/ν − s > 0, 1 + τ1−σ > ξ
1
Ξ−1 holds. These two conditions
establish λ¯ > 1 in the main text. We also show that if Φ(·) = 0 has a solution with ϕx1 ,λ > 1,
the partial derivatives of Φ are ∂Φ/∂λ > 0, ∂Φ/∂ϕx1 > 0, and ∂Φ/∂τ > 0. As a side product,
we also show that ϕu1/ϕ
x
1 > 1 must hold in this case.
A.8 Existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium
As outlined in the main text, if u+ η/ν − s ≤ 0, we have λ = 1 and in this case the parameter
constraint in (28) is necessary and suﬃcient for an outcome with ϕx1 > 1 and λ = 1 – see the
discussion below Eq. (A.16). A similar result is obtained if u+ ην − s > 0 and 1+ τ1−σ ≤ ξ
1
Ξ−1 ,
because in this case Φ(·) = 0 has no solution with ϕx1 ,λ > 1, and, hence, under parameter
constraint (28) the equilibrium values of ϕx1 and λ are given by Ω(ϕ
x
1 , 1; τ, fx) = 0. The third
possible scenario is one with u + ην − s > 0 and 1 + τ1−σ ≥ ξ
1
Ξ−1 , and in this case both
Ω(ϕx1 ,λ; τ, fx) = 0 and Φ(λ,ϕ
x
1 ; τ) = 0 are consistent with ϕ
x
1 ,λ > 1. This does not mean that
the implicit functions Ω(·) = 0 and Φ(·) = 0 have an intersection point in the relevant (ϕx1 ,λ)-
space. However, by parameter constraint (31) it is ensured that Ω(1, λ¯; τ, fx) > 0 and since
∂Ω/∂λ < 0, it must be true that at low levels of ϕx1 , Φ(·) = 0 lies below Ω(·) = 0 in the relevant
(ϕx1 ,λ)-space. Hence, if there is no intersection of the two implicit function loci, the equilibrium
realisations of ϕx1 and λ must again be characterised by Ω(ϕ
x
1 , 1; τ, fx) = 0. In a final step, we
show that if Φ(·) = 0 and Ω(·) = 0 intersect for some ϕx1 ,λ > 1, the intersection point must
be unique. A suﬃcient condition for this is that inequality (32) holds in the intersection point.
Using the partial derivatives of Ω and Φ, we can rewrite this inequality as follows
−
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘ [C − 1]
C
<
1
ξ
(1 − ν)(u+ η − 1)
g + 1− νs− (1− ν)u
(ϕx1)
− gΘB(ρ), (A.21)
where C ≡ (1 + τ1−σ)1−Ξλ−Ξ(1−ν)[u+η/ν−s] and
B(ρ) ≡
(ϕx1)
g
Θ − ξ−
ν(u+η/ν−s)
gν−∆[1+ν(σ−1)] ρν(u+η/ν−s)(ϕx1)
u
Γ
ρ∆[1+ν(σ−1)]−gν − ξ
−
ν(u+η−1)
gν−∆[1+ν(σ−1)] ρν(u+η/ν−s)(ϕx1)
u
Γ
. (A.22)
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Diﬀerentiating the left-hand side of (A.21) with respect to C gives −[(ϕx1)
−g/θ − 1]/C2 > 0. In
view of C ≤ 2, we can thus safely conclude that
−
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘ [C − 1]
C
< −
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘ
2
. (A.23)
Let us now turn to the right-hand side of (A.21). Diﬀerentiating B(ρ) gives B′(ρ) > 0, implying
B(ρ) > B
(
ξ
1
gν−∆[1+ν(σ−1)]
)
= ξ
(ϕx1)
g
Θ − (ϕx1)
u
Γ
1− (ϕx1)
u
Γ
. (A.24)
Since
−
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘ
2
<
(1− ν)(u+ η − 1)
g + 1− νs− (1− ν)u
(ϕx1)
g
Θ − (ϕx1)
u
Γ
1− (ϕx1)
u
Γ
(ϕx1)
− gΘ . (A.25)
holds for any ϕx1 > 1, we can safely conclude that if Φ(·) = 0 and Ω(·) = 0 have an intersection
point in the (ϕx1 ,λ)-space, this intersection point must be unique.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 1
We consider ωu(1) = 0 and ω′u(λ) > 0 from Eq. (A.8) and show that ωs(λ) > ωu(λ) and thus
ωs(λ) > 0 holds for all λ ≤ λ¯. If λ = 1, the exporter wage premium of skilled workers in
Eq. (A.11) simplifies to ωs(1) in Eq. (23). Since dωs(1)/dτ < 0 and limτ→∞ ωs(1) = 0, it
follows that ωs(1) > 0 for all (finite values of) τ , whereas ωu(1) = 0 is established by Eq.
(A.8). If u + η/ν − s > 0 allows for λ > 1, we can make use of ϕx2/ϕ
x
1 from Eq. (19) and
ϕu1/ϕ
x
1 = ϕ
u
1/ϕ
u
2 × ϕ
u
2/ϕ
x
2 × ϕ
x
2/ϕ
x
1 = ρ(λ; τ)
νξ
− νgν−∆[1+ν(σ−1)] from Eqs. (19), (A.19), and the
definition of λ and rewrite the exporter wage premium of skilled workers in Eq. (A.11) as follows
ωs(λ) =
Ξ
Ξ− 1
∆
gν
{
1− (1 + τ1−σ)−1−Ξλ−Ξ(1−ν)(u+η/ν−s)
×
[
gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
+
(1− ν)(u+ η − 1)
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
λνs+(1−ν)u−1
]}
, (A.26)
with
ω′s(λ) =
(1 + τ1−σ)−1−Ξλ−Ξ(1−ν)(u+η/ν−s)−1
1 + ν(σ − 1)
[
gν(1 − ν)(u+ η/ν − s)
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
−
[g + 1− νs− (1− ν)u](1− ν)[u+ η − 1]
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
λνs+(1−ν)u−1
]
, (A.27)
Since the bracket term on the right hand side is decreasing in λ and since ω′s(1) ∝ −(g+1−u−η),
which is negative according to Assumption 1, we can safely conclude that ω′s(λ) < 0 holds for
all possible λ. Using ω′u(λ) > 0 and
ωs(λ¯) =
Ξ
Ξ− 1
∆
gν
{
1−
(1− ν)(u+ η − 1)
νs + (1− ν)u− 1
1
ξ
−
gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)]
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
λ¯1−/νs−(1−ν)u
}
, (A.28)
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it follows that ωs(λ) − ωu(λ) > ∆ˆω(λ¯) ≡ ωs(λ¯) − ωu(λ¯), ∆ˆ′ω(λ¯) > 0, and ∆ˆω(1) = [Ξ/(Ξ −
1)][∆/(gν)](1 − 1/ξ) > 0.30 Hence, we can conclude that ωs(λ) > ωu(λ) ≥ 0 holds for all
possible λ. This completes the proof.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 2
Since a detailed proof of Proposition 2 is tedious, we provide a sketch of how such a proof
can be organised here and defer a more detailed formal discussion to a Supplement, which is
available upon request. Starting point is the observation that the Theil index respects (mean-
normalised) second order stochastic dominance, and thus ranks income distribution in the open
economy as more unequal than the income distribution in the closed economy, if the latter
Lorenz dominates the former. To put it diﬀerently, if Lorenz curves do not intersect, we can
use them to establish the ranking of income distributions from the Theil index. Regarding the
Lorenz curves of unskilled workers, we have to distinguish three segments in the open economy
if λ > 1. The diﬀerence between Lorenz curves in the closed and the open economy for segment
1, with β ≤ ϕu1 is given by
∆u1(µu) ≡ [1− (1− µu)]
1
Γ
[
1−
1
1 + (ϕu1 )
−uΓωu
]
, (A.29)
which is positive and decreasing in the share of unskilled workers µu over ability interval (1,ϕu1 ].
Let us first consider the case of unskilled workers. The diﬀerentials in the second and third
segments of the Lorenz curve are given by
∆u2(µu) ≡ 1− (1− µu)
1
Γ −
1
1 + (ϕu1 )
−uΓωu
{
1− (ϕu1 )
−uΓ
+ (ϕu1 )
−uΓ
u+ η − 1
νs+ (1− ν)u− 1
[
1−
[
(ϕu1 )
−u(1− µu)
] νs+(1−ν)u−1
u
]}
(A.30)
and
∆u3(µu) ≡ (1− µu)
1
Γ
[
λν(u+η/ν−s)
1 + (ϕu1 )
−uΓωu
− 1
]
, (A.31)
respectively. ∆u3(µu) is positive and decreasing in the share of unskilled workers µu over the entire
ability interval [ϕu2 ,∞). Furthermore, we have∆
u
1(µ
1
u1) = ∆
u
2(µ
1
u1) and∆
u
2(µ
2
u2) = ∆
u
3(µ
2
u2), with
µ1u1 ≡ 1 − (ϕ
u
1 )
−u and µ2u2 ≡ 1 − (ϕ
u
2 )
−u, respectively. Noting further that d∆u2/d(µu) < 0, it
follows that ∆u2(µu) > 0 must hold over ability interval (ϕ
u
1 ,ϕ
u
2 ). This confirms that distribution
of unskilled wages in the closed economy Lorenz dominates the distribution of unskilled wages
in the open economy, so that Tu must be larger in the open than the closed economy, whenever
λ > 1. If λ = 1, the Theil index for unskilled wages is not aﬀected by trade.
Let us now turn to the Lorenz curve for skilled wages, which has five (three) segments if
30Rearranging terms in Eq. (A.19), one can show that in a scenario with u+η/ν−s > 0, which is a prerequisite
for λ > 1, we have ξ >,=, < 1 if gν −∆[1 + ν(σ − 1)] >,=, < 0. This establishes ∆ˆω(1) > 0.
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λ > (=)1. For the first segment the diﬀerence between the Lorenz curve in closed and the open
economy is
∆s1(µs) ≡ [1− (1− µs)]
g
sΘ
[
1−
1
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘωu
]
, (A.32)
which is positive and increasing in the share of skilled workers over ability interval (1,ϕx1 ]. The
diﬀerential for the fifth segment of the Lorenz curve is given by
∆s5(µs) = (1− µs)
g
sΘ
{
1
1 + (ϕx1)
− gΘωs
(1 + τ1−σ)
(
ϕx1
ϕx2
)gΘ−1Θ
− 1
}
. (A.33)
It is positive and decreasing over ability interval [ϕx2 ,∞). We do not display the remaining three
segments here, but refer the interested reader to our Supplement. There, we show that ∆si > 0
indeed holds for all i = 1, 2, ..., 5. Accordingly, the wage distribution of skilled workers in the
closed economy Lorenz dominates the wage distribution of skilled workers in the open economy,
so that Ts must be larger with trade than under autarky, irrespective of whether λ is larger than
or equal to one. This completes the proof.
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